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ABSTRACT
Thetextile industry's political power stemmed from its importance in southern states plus
the power of the Southern delegation in the U.S. Congress in the 1960s. The strongest resistance
to the industry's pressure for protection came from the foreign policy interests of the Executive
branch. A constellation of influences explains why negotiated, or voluntary export restraints
(VERs). sanctioned by international agreements (the Multi-Fiber Arrangement) was the form
protection took. First, the Japanese industry, at the time the world's leading textile exporter,
already in the 1930s had exhibited a willingness to accept negotiated agreements totrade
disputes. Second, the U.S. Executive, having been a leader in establishing the GAiT system to
control the sort of unilateral restrictive actions that contributed to the 1930s depression, was
reluctant to take unilateral action. Third, the arrangement was acceptable to the U.S. industry
because, through their particular power over agricultural legislation, the Southern delegation won
passage, as amendments to agriculture bills, of legislation to enforcethese 'voluntary restraints
at the U.S. border. But because enforcement remained with the Executive branch,it tended to
follow the letter of the agreements, hence exports could continue to expand by shifting to new
product varieties and to new supplier counties.
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The United States Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate commerce with foreign
nations. Yet, since the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930,Congresshas been reluctant to impose protection
directly, choosing instead to delegate that authority to the Executive branch. Yet Congress has never
given the Executive unlimited authority to regulate trade: instead, it has allowed the Executive Branch
to take specific actions under well defined circumstances.
Given Congress' preference for indirect protection, special interests seeking protection must either
(a) nudge Congress to legislate conditions which would justify protection and/or (b) convince the
Executive that economic conditions satisfy previously legislated criteria for protection.Because
administered protection often gives the Executive considerable discretion, an industry seeking protection
must not only convince the Executive that the industry meets the criteria set by Congress but that the
industry is also "deserving" of protection. The action of the Executive is thus as much a political act as
is passage by Congress of laws that establish administered protection.'
In the post-World War U era, the U.S. textile industry achieved a degree of protection which was
unparalleled in the rest of the manufacturing sector. its success is evident from the fact that it was the
only industry for which the US government negotiated a multilateral arrangement for quotas within the
framework of the GAiT. But the international arrangements that were negotiated did not establish limits
on US imports: those limits were imposed through administrative actions. The authority of the Executive
to take these actions rested on the legislation passed by the US Congress, not on international agreements
such as the MEA. Thus protection for the textile industry was administered protection, not directly
legislated protection.
Our focus in this paper is on the administrative dimensions of protection. Our contention is that
the game played within these administrative mechanisms was different from the game played in the high-
level politics of protection. Those interests that opposed protection had a significant influence on which
sectors within textiles and garments received protection, as well as on the degree of protection.
We emphasize the administrative dimension for two reasonS: (1) the more visible conflict between
nations over the international agreements to restrict textile and apparel trade have been extensively and
skillfully studied, and (2) overlooking the administrative dimension of how protection was put in place
leads one to overlook one of the most powerful actors in the story —thestate itself. In determining the
scope and magnitude of protection to US textile and garment interests, the US government was much
more than a neutral intermediary. It was one of the most influential players in the game.
We begin our analysis with a review in Section II of political economy models of protection. We
go on to apply these models to analyze (1) how the textile and apparels industries won the creation of the2
MFA system of protection (sections ifi- V),and (2) how, within this system, quotas were determined
on individualproductsimported from diflèrent countries (sectionsVI, VIII). Inthe final section we
evaluate the most important influences on protection in the textile andgarment industries.
II.POLITICALECONOMYMODELS OF PROTECTION
Theoretical models on the political economy of protection (see, for example, discussionsby
Baldwin (1985) and Tretler (1993)) provide a useful starting point for our analysis.
Effective ornnization. Many theories emphasize that in a representativedemocracy, where there
are costs to participation as well as information costs, those who gain most from protection willorganize
into political pressure groups. Success, in turn, will depend on the relativeability of different groups
to overcome the free-rider problem. Although only some voters or businessgroups provide resources
to support lobbying,allthe members of a particular sector are likely to gain. This suggests that —other
factors constant —sectorswith fewer numbers of workers and more concentrated productionstructures
will lobby more effectively for protection. Activities with fewer andlarger producing units, and
protected from entry by significant barriers to entry would be expected to be more effective inwinning
protection.
Value of the nolitical payoff. Other theories, suchas the so-called "adding machine" model
formulated by Caves (1976), focus instead on the behavior ofpoliticians who seek to maximize their
election prospects. The adding machine modelsuggests that protection increases with the number of
employees in an industry. Empirically, this suggests that protection rises with the number ofvoters who
earn their living in the sector, i.e.. with the size of its workforce. Theadding machine model and the
special interest model described above imply opposite relations between the size ofa sector's worlcforce
and its political influence.
Other theories bring out qualitative dimensions of the results ofpolitical action. Some focus on
the likelihood that more disadvantaged sectors of thepopulation are more likely to receive protection.
Baldwin (1985) reviews what he describes as the "adjustment assistance" modeland the "equity-concern'
model. In the first case, the govermnent seeks to minimize short-mn laboradjustment costs and protects
sectors which are having the most difficulty adjusting. Thissuggests that low-growth sectors are more
likely to be protected. In altruism or equity-concern models, politicians want low-incomeworkers (i.e.,
those with lower wage rates) to be protected from tradepolicy changes. Caves also suggests that
protection is more likely in sectors with many, smaller plants. Another consideration that willcondition
the value to a politician of political action toprotect a particular sector is the importance to the3
politician's constituencyofthat sector. Actionin favorof a sector that provides a large share of
constituent jobsis more likely than actionin favor of onethatprovidesa smaller share.
Thealtruismmodels discussed abovesuggest that factorsotherthan the immediateself-interest
ofthe decision-makers influencethedegree of protectionasector will receive.2 The following
paragraphssummarize other modelsthat likewise take into account influences other than the immediate
economic interests of the sector in question.
Power. influence of the exportin2countries.The relationshipbetween theUnitedStates and the
exporting country might also influence a decision to protect or not to protect aparticularsector. (See,
for example, Helleiner (1977) for a lengthier discussion of such considerations). In the context of a
bargaining framework, the United States is most likely to impose traderestraintson countries whose
retaliation would be less costly to the United States. One implication is that the US would be more likely
to protect products where the majority of imports are received from small countries or countries that
import little from the United States.' More general foreign policy considerations point to historically
established relationships and the strategic interests of the United States e.g.. the location of US military
bases.
The attraction to the United States government in recent years of policy instruments such as
"Super 301" suggest that the perceived commercial fairness of the exporting countries might also be a
determinant of which US sectors are protected. For example, the perception that Japan has evaded its
OAT!' responsibilities and has maintained high trade barriers in Japan is likely to lead to restrictive US
actions against Japanese exports, despite the fact that Japan is a large country and receives a large volume
of US exports.
On the other hand, equity concerns could apply as well, particularly if such concerns overlap with
US strategic interests. Special programs for US allies, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, have been
introduced to allow poorer countries access to the US market that their bargaining power or strategic
worth would not predict.
The power of the state. With administered protection, the outcome on protection is likely to be
different from a direct vote, special interest model. Congress creates administered protection mechanisms
because these mechanisms insulate the state from special interests.4 Particularly in the early years of
administered protection, the Executive enjoyed considerable discretion even when the criteria for
protection were met. This discretionary authority allowed a considerable discrepancy between constituent
pressures and the resulting protection. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA)of 1934 was a
particularly important change in the mechanics of protection. The discretion granted the Executivein4
other mechanisms could frustrate constituent pressures for increased protection, The RTAAserved not
only to thwart industryspecific pressures for protection,but to create momentum for reducing protection.
111. PROTECTION, 1930s
The Smoot-Hawley tariff was passed in 1930. The reaction of other countriesto the Smoot-
Hawley Act, combined with the world-wide economic depression, made it politically impossible that
Congress would vote additional protection. But there remained administrative mechanisms through which
such action might be encouraged. Section 336 of the Smoot-Hawley act providedone such avenue, the
trade section of the National Industrial Recovery Act provided another.Passage in 1934 of the
ReciprocalTradeAgreements Act provided a means by which the President could negotiate down US
tariff rates, but its provisions could not be used to gain an increase in protection.
The NIRA and Drotection
One administrative avenue to protection was provided by the National IndustrialRecovery Act,
passed in June 1933. This act provided for companies in an industry to negotiate and maintain, under
government supervision, codes of fair competition. In addition to their provisions for maintaining product
prices, the codes set up specific standart to improve labor conditions, specifically: (1)setting an industry
minimum wage, one substantially above the prevailing marketrate, (2) limiting hours of work per week.
and (3) improving working conditions. The NIBS code established in the textileindustry included the
elimination of child labor, defined as employment ofpersons under sixteen.
Section 3(e) of the NIRA recognized the necessity ofpreventing foreign competition from
rendering these codes ineffective. Section 3(e) provided that the Tariff Commission, when directedby
the President to do so, would investigate the conditions ofcompetition resulting from increasing imports.
If the Commission found that imports were interfering with theoperation of a code, the Commission was
to recommend to the president the import restraint —eithera quota or an additional import fee —that
would eliminate the effects of imports on operation of the code.
The National Industrial Recovery Act had a short history: the USSupreme Coup decision in the
Schechter Poultry Case of May 27, 1935, rendered itpractically inoperative. After that dare the Tariff
Commission suspended work on all Section 3(e) cases underway, and never opened another case)
The investigations the Tariff Commission undertook under Section3(e) of the NIRA are listed
in Table 1. Of the ten completed investigations, seven led toimport controls, including five VERs. Of
the five VERs, four were with Japan.
Each of the investigations involving Japan displayed twocommon characteristics: (1) there was
large difference between the price of imports from Japan versus imports from othersources, and (2)5
Japan had quickly become the dominant supplier of imports of the article, often the dominant supplier
of the article in the US market. In the lead pencils case, for example, imports had been corning primarily
from (ennany and Czechoslovakia. In 1933, Japan became the main source, supplying 70 percent of
US imports. Japanese prices far undercut the other exporters: Japan, $0.23/gross; Germany, $4/gross;
Czechoslovakia, $3/gross.6Thecotton chenille rugs investigation found that Japan's share of the US
market hadgonefrom 12 percent of domestic consumption in 1931 to 80 percent by December 1933.
From the beginning to the end of 1933, US domestic production on a monthly basis fell by 85 percent.7
Each of the cases involving Japanese exports ended with a VEIL The four rugs cases displayed
a pattern of outcome that would become standard for textile products: import duties to control imports
from Europe, VERs to control imports from Japan. Of the four rugs investigations, for example, only
the investigation of imitation oriental rugs did not lead to a VER. but this typeofrug was imported
almost entirely from Europe: France, Belgium and Italy.'
Resolution of most of the NIR.A Section 3(e) complaints by negotiating VEP.s was not an unusual
outcome.9 Indeed, the Tariff Commission itself, in its 1934 Annual Renort pointed out that negotiation
of a VER was in the 1930s a common form of import relief.'0
Section 336
Section 336 of the Smoot-Hawley act established a mechanism for administrative adjustment of
tariff rates. In a Section 336 case, the US Tariff Commission would conduct an investigation to
determine the cost of producing a product in the United States and in exporting countries. Based on that
information, the Tariff Commission would then recommend to the President the rate change that would
"equalize competition." i.e., a tariff rate that would make the foreign cost plus the tariff equal to the
domestic cost.
Section 336 allowed for applications for tariff reductions as well as for increases. As Table 2
shows, one-third of requests for investigations were for investigations to support reductions of tariffs."
Investigations could begin in several ways: by the Tariff Commission's own motion, by order of the
President, by request of either house of Congress or by request of an interested party.'2
TheTariff Commission's response to these requests reflects both the reluctance of the Executive
to increase US tariff rates and the deference it paid to Congress on such matters. All of the 82 requests
for "Investigation" without specification if the objective was an increase or a reduction of a tariff rate
were requested by Senate resolution, and all of them led to initiation of investigations.' But of the
requests for tariff increases, 85 percent were dismissed by the Tariff Commission without initiation of
an investigation. The reluctance of the Executive to increase protection is also reflected in the outcomes6
of the investigations that were undertaken. Almost half the time (as Table 3 reports), the Tariff
Commission recommended no change of the tariff.In all, the Commission initiated Section 336
investigations on 101products,and only 29 of these led to tariff increases. An almost equal number,
twenty-five, produced a tariff reduction.
When the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934, negotiations between the United
States and exporting countries became an alternative means for reducing tariffs. A 1935 tabulation by
the US Tariff Commission lists over 400 reductions of the US tariff through reciprocal negotiations.
With the availability of this means for tariff reductions and the demonstrated reluctance of the Executive
to increase protection through Section 336 actions, Section 336 was used less and less. The Tariff
Commission reports no applications for Section 336 investigations after 1941.
Use of these mechanisms by the textile and anparel industry
At the time the NIRA was struck down by the Supreme Court, the Tariff Commission was
conducting a section 3(e) investigation on cotton cloth. This investigation was suspended, but soon came
back in another guise. The sequence of events that led to a voluntary restraint agreement was as follows:
March1935:
TheSenate directed the Tariff Commission to investigate under Section 336.
April 1935:
The TC investigation began.
October 1935:
Negotiation of a VER began between the US and Japanese governments. The US State
Department requested that the Tariff Commission delay submitting its report.
April 1936:
Under industry pressure, the TC sent its report to the President, recommending a tariff increase.
The State Department recommended that the President delay action.
May 1936:
The President proclaimed a tariff increase of 42 percent.
August 1936:
Private direct negotiations replaced government-to- government negotiations.
January 1937:
The Japanese cotton industry agreed to quotas for 1937 and 1938, later extended to cover 1939
and 1940.7
The agreement struck between the US and Japanese industries was quite detailed. Besides
specifying export limits, the agreement specified how to measure exports and how to handle transshipment
from third countriesto theUS. The memorandum of understanding between the industries also
established a joint committeeofrepresentatives from each country's industry, the function of the
committee would be to deal with whatever administrative difficulties might arise and to act as a
negotiating committee in establishing subsequent arrangements between the two industries re future
limitations or other means of control."(p. 63)
The quotas were only 64% filled over the four years they were in effect. Bauge (pp. 66ff.)
explains that the US industry had been willing to accept a large quota to pin down the Japanese in the
future. Also,in 1937. Japandeclared war on China, the war took an increased share of Japanese output
and Japanese resources were allocated tootherindustries moredirectlysupportive ofthewar.
Similar sequences of events led to VERs with Japan on cotton hosiery and on velveteen and
corduroy. In the agreement on velveteen and corduroy, the US industry agreed to refrain from requesting
the Tariff Commission to publish and send to the President its report, provided the Japanese exports
remained within the agreed quota.'3
Lessons from the 1930s
Although the US textile industry during the 1930s was heavily protected, its protection was about
average relative to other US industries. The US textile industry caine into the decade with protection at
about equal to the avenge for all US industries, and it was no more successful than other industries in
the 1930s a! gaining increased protection.
The administration of President Franklin Roosevelt initially assigned the tariff in a domestic
policy role, but a secondary one: the tariff was to be used to defend the domestic economic policies set
out in the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. After passage of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, import protection became increasing a foreign policyconcernof the
Executive. One consequence wa s that the Executive's interest shifted toward reductions, not increases
in the tariff. As trade policy became more of a foreign policyconcern,the Executive turned increasingly
to VERs when pressed to restrict imports. Negotiations were the traditional means of conducting foreign
policy, hence it was only logical that the Executive should increasingly use this means for limiting US
imports.S
Both the tying of the tariff to specific domestic policies and its later use as a foreign policy tool
demonstrates the power of the state to isolate trade policy from immediate constituent pressures. This
is the primary lesson of the 1930s import policy experience.
IV.THE 1950s: FROMORDINARYPROTECTIONTOEXCEPTIONAL TREATMENT
From1950 to 1962, merchandise imports of textiles and apparel accounted for about 3% of US
GNP,decliningfrom 6% at the end of the 1930s and 10% in the l920s. In the textile industry, Figure
I shows that imports took a smaller share of US consumption of textiles than of other industrial goods.
Clearly,high importvolumes on average were not the primary deteiminant of protection in the industry.
Yet increases in imports tended to be concentrated in specific product lines, which consolidated the
opposition. By the early 1960s imports took more than 1/3 of the US market in several categories of
textile products. These import surges prompted inflammatory statements against Japanese exports and
an occasional Congressional bill to impose quotas or other sorts of limits.'6
The Con2ressional Politics of Trade Policy
There was little chance that such bills would gain approval. The lessons of the Smoot-Hawley
tariff were fresh in mind, and Congress was reluctant to encourage direct Congressional action. Congress
had created several administrative routes to protection, discussed below. Through each of these, a specific
administrative finding gave the President authority to restrict imports, but left him with the discretionary
authority not to do so. There was evolving the political system that I. M. Destler (1992) has called
'protection for Congress1" in which a representative under pressure to protect imports could direct a
constituent to the appropriate administrative mechanism.
Although the Executive's administration of these mechanisms was designed to provide minimal
protection, such mechanisms sheltered Congress against the wrath of special interests who pressured
membersfor importrelief. The 1950s were generally prosperous times during which the United States
enjoyed substantial trade surpluses. Pointing a protection-seeking industry into a maze of administrative
procedures bought time. By the time the industry eventually emerged from the end of the maze without
a prize, business had improved and it pressed its case no further. Besides, the system satisfied the
American sense of fairness. It provided a place to complain where officials listened, investigated and
held hearings. One had one's day in court. To complain further would be un-American, and maybe even
pro-communist, if the closing of the US market tipped a country to the Soviet side in the Cold War.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade solidified the reciprocal trade agreements approach
as the general approach to tariff setting, further minimizing the likelihood that Congress would return to
direct tariff-making. This further assured that the "ordinary"process of tariff-making or a direct9
Congressionalvote of special protection would be difficult avenues to protection. There were, however
other mechanisms available.
The PresidentialPolitics of Trade Policy:Trade Policy as Foreign Policy
There was even less chance that a protectionist billwould avoid a Presidentialveto.Whilethe
Congress perceived trade policy as a means for helping local industry, the Executive branch of the US
government saw trade policy as an important instrument of foreign policy.'7 The ideas that dominated
Executive branch thinking are revealed in the following two statements from Cordell Hull, the first
Secretary of State to President Franklin Roosevelt and the father of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
I felt that all nations should be urged to make their chief rallying point the establishment
of a state of world order under law, so as to maintain conditions of permanent peace)'
The other statement expresses in a more casual way the role trade could play in establishing
peace:
When I was a boy on the farm in Tennessee, we had two neighbors —I'llcall them
Jenkins and Jones —whowere enemies of each other. For many years there had been
bad feelings between them— Idon't know why —andwhen they met on the road or in
town or at church, they stared at each other coldly and didn't speak.
Then one of Jenkins' mules went lame in the spring just when Jenkins needed him most
for plowing. At the same time Jones ran short of corn for his hogs. Now it so happened
that Jones was through with his own plowing and had a mule to spare, and Jenkins had
a bin filled with corn. A friendly third party brought the two men together, and Jones
let Jenkins use his mule in exchange for corn for the hogs.
As a result, it wasn't long before the two old enemies were the best of friends. A
common-sense trade and ordinary neighborliness had made them aware of their economic
need of each other and brought them peace.'9
In addition to the Wilsonian idea of international rule of law and the populist idea that trading
made good neighbors, the Executive's instinct to trade policy was also conditioned by two decades of10
process, wo decades in which the Executive had been in an almost continuous negotiation with its trading
partners over trade restrictions. Not just principle, but conditioned reflex pushed the Executive away
from unilateral action on trade restrictions.
The Textile Industry's Strategy
The textile industry's strategy was the obvious one: to maintain pressure on all political fronts
and at the same time to use all administrative remedies available.
On the political front, through the 1950s the textile industry was active at public hearings
concerning the US government's intentions to cut tariffs. These included not only hearings on proposed
negotiating authority, but also the hearings the trade agreements required on the products on which it
mightnegotiatetariff reductions, e.g., peril point" hearings. In 1955. the industry placed special focus
on opposing the Eisenhower administration's trade bill that asked for the tariff-cutting authority that
eventually allowed US participation in the Dillon Round of GATT negotiations.
Trade Remedies and VERs
The activity of the industry created considerable concern in Japan. The Japanese feared that the
textile industry would either win special protection from the US Congress, or succeed inlimiting the
authority that Congress would grant the President to negotiate a general reduction of US import
restrictions. In August 1955 the Textile Export Council of Japan established a committee ofgovernment
and industry members to develop a solution for the situation in the United States. This committeesent
a team to Washington where it met with US industry officials. The US industry team reported to the US
State Department that the Japanese were willing to negotiate a settlement, but the US StateDepartment
replied that they would vigorously oppose quotas, even negotiated quotas. The US industry however
carried their case to the White House and President Eisenhower asked his chief-of-staff, Sherman Adams
to meet with the Japanese. As a result of these negotiations, the Japanese industry-government textile
committee announced in December 1955 that they intended to restriát their 1956exports to the United
States of cotton cloth and of couon blouses.
The US industry took steps to assure that these limits would beput in place, but at the same time
viewed the arrangement as inadequate. The arrangement covered too fewproducts and it covered only
Japan. The industry also preferred a restraint system which was not dependent on the Japanese
government or industry for enforcement, i.e., in which the US administration would have the legal
authority to enforce the limits at the US border.
In this regard, the industry achieved an important victory when it won (inMay 1956) the addition
of Section 204 to the Agriculture Act of 1956. Section 204 authorized the Presidentto negotiate with11
foreigngovernments to limit the export to the US of agricultural or textile products, and to carry out such
an agreement by limiting the entry of such products into the United States.
But the industry was learning that creating the legal authority for the President to limit imports
oftextiles isone thing, inducing him touse thatauthority is another. In August 1955 the American
TextileManufacturersInstitutepetitionedtheSecretaryof Agriculture for broaderimportquotas under
Section 22 of the AgriculturalAdjustmentAct.Likewise, in early 1956severalcompanies petitionedthe
TariffCommission for "escape clauses investigations.
While these administrative mechanisms provided additional tribunes from which the industry could
present its case for protection, none of the petitions led directly to import relief. However, how the US
government and the Japanese industry reacted to their use provides some insight into the concerns and
the politicsofthe matter.
Section22, added to the AgriculturalAdjustment Acton August 24, 1935, authorizes the
Presidentto impose import feesorquotas to restrict imports of agricultural commodities or theoroducts
thereof if thoseimportsrenderortend to render ineffective or materially interfere with US agricultural
programs. The section, by design, was similar in scope and purpose to Section 3(e) of the NIRA.2'
The first attempt by the textile industry to use Section 22 had been in 1939. President Roosevelt
however directed the Tariff Commission to undertake separate investigations of raw cotton and of cotton
textile products. Price support programs under the AAA had moved US fiber prices above world prices,
and had attracted substantial foreign sales. At the same time, the domestic price of cotton being higher
than the world price put textile manufacturers at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign manufacturers.
In 1939, within four weeks of the President's directive to the Tariff Commission, the Commission
had reported in the affirmative on cotton fiber and the President ordered a tight quota on imports. But
the Commission delayed for more than two years its investigation of imports of cotton manufactures, and
eventually terminated the investigation when World War II disrupted foreign supply and revived domestic
demand.
In 1955, the Eisenhower Administration exploited the fact that there were no deadlines for the
various steps in the Section 22 process and left the matter tied up in the Secretary of Agriculture's
preliminary investigation. Continued pressure however from the industry and its Congressional delegation
eventually won a meeting with the Secretary of Commerce plus the relevant Assistant Secretaries of State,
Commerce and Agriculture. In this meeting the government offered a three point program:
I. to urge third countries to import more from Japan;12
2. a feeequalizingthe internal and the world prices of cotton would be paid on all textile exports;
and
3. formal diplomatic notes wouldbeexchangedwithJapan, officially taking note of Japan's
voluntaryexport controls.
The industrycontinued to press for legislative action and camewithina 43-45 Senate vote of
attaching to a foreign aid bill an amendment mandating textile import quotas.
All the while, government-to-government negotiations continuedwith Japan. Theseresulted, in
January 1957, intheJapanese govenunent announcing a comprehensive plan to control textile exports
to the United States?
Throughout thenegotiationswith Japan, the Executive avoided the activation of Section 22's
authority torestrict imports. Though thetextile industry had petitionedin 1955 for Section 22action,
when the restraint agreement was concluded in 1957 the Secretary of Agriculture still had not completed
his preliminary investigation. As in 1939, the Administration was reluctant to take steps that would
provide it explicit legal authority to restrict textile imports?
The Japanese industry and government seemed to share that concern. Bauge (p. 129) points out
that soon aftertheTariff Commission initiated an investigation of injury from imports of a product, e.g.,
cotton gingham, the Japanese government announced exports limits on the product. While the escape
clauseallowedthe President discretion not to act even when the Tariff Commission returned an
affirmative injury finding and recommended import relief, it did not give the President discretionto
prevent a Tariff Commission investigation. An interested party could petition the Commission directly,
and the Commission had no authority to turn down a valid petition.
Hong Kong Holds Out
As the industry was convincing the Executive to arrange a VER with Japan. Hong Kong was
becoming a significant exporter. Hong Kong in 1961 supplied almost 35 percent of US imports of cotton
textiles in 1961, up from less than 1/2 of one percent in 1956. But Hong Kong proved more difficult
than Japan to push into a voluntary agreement? As a foreign policy matter, Hong Kong was important
to the United States as a capitalist example and as a post for gathering information on China. And Hong
Kong was a colony of the United Kingdom, thereby enjoying the benefits of the special relationship that
existed in post World War 11 years between the United States and the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, Hong Kong had earlier agreed to limit its textile exports to the United Kingdom,
and had learned several hard lessons from that experience. With Hong Kongexports restrained, India's
and Pakistan'sexportsto the United Kingdom began to grow. And as soon as Hong Kong had agreed13
to restraints on exports to the United Kingdom, France. Germany and Switzerland had begun to press
for similar restraints, including restraints on Hong Kong exports to France's colonies and former colonies
in Africa. The United Kingdom had promised to support Hong Kong in resisting such expansion to other
countries, but had not proven vigorous in doing so.
Furthermore. Hong Kong had fewer economic alternatives than Japan. indeed, MITT at the time
was counseling the Japanese textile industry to move from cotton textiles to synthetics. Hong Kong, on
the other hand, had to find some way for a rapidly increasing population to earn a living, as continuing
numbers crossed the border from China. Providing a job particularly in the clothing industry required
minimal investment and demanded minimal skill.
There were pressures within Hong Kong that favored negotiation of export limits. Aggarwal (pp.
68ff.) points to the problem that small Hong Kong exporters were creating for larger companies. Just
as Japan was seeing its sales of cotton manufactures displaced by Hong Kong sales, large Hong Kong
manufacturers were aggressively courting buyers who caine to Hong Kong. Aggarwal quotes the
Eastern Economic Review calling for the Hong Kong government to step in to control exports to the US
unless the small manufacturers would "agree to temper their ambition." (Aggarwal. p.69)
A second factor that pushed toward Hong Kong accepting limits was a suggestion by President
Eisenhower that the US government would, as a quid pro quo, support US private investment in Hong
Kong.
Hong Kong, in December 1959, offered to limit for three years its exports of five categoriesof
garments, but asked for growth allowances of 10 to 15 percent and for provision to carryforward any
quota not used in a year. The US industry refused to accept, and importsfrom Hong Kong were not
controlled until the Short Term Arrangement bad been signed and the US Congress had delegated to the
President the power to enforce limits at the US border.
How the Executive Frustrated the Use of Trade Remedies
The industry attempted again in 1959 and in 1961 to use Section 22. In June 1959 theNational
Cotton Council and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute filed with the Secretaryof Agriculture
a Section 22 petition that asked for quotas on cotton textile and apparel imports.President Eisenhower
took advantage of administrative regulations that bad been issued by President Rooseveltin 1937. He
directed the Tariff Commission to investigate, but severely limited the scope of theCommission's
investigation. He directed the Commission to investigate if it were necessary,in order to prevent cotton
textile imports from interfering with the cotton export program, to impose a fee on importedcotton
textiles, equal to the amount of the subsidy on raw cotton exports."14
Thus, President Eisenhower's directive to the Tariff Commission frustrated theindustry's petition.
It eliminated quotas as a possible form of relief. More critically, it focused theinvestigation on how
textile imports affected the cotton export program rather the cottonprice support program.
in June 1960, the Commission ruled 4-2 that textileimportswere not interfering with the cotton
export program.
in 1961, after President Eisenhower had retired and John F.Kennedy was President, the industry
filed a similar petition. it met the same ftte. The Tariff Commission,proceeding within a Presidential
specification that was in substance the same as what President Eisenhower had delivered inthe 1959 case,
again ruled 4-2 that textile imports were not interfering with the cottonexport program?
At about the same time the American Textile Manufacturers Institute askedfor quotas on imports
of cotton, synthetic fiber, silk and wool products under the nationalsecurity provisions of the Trade
Agreements Act. The ATM! pressed the matter on occasionthrough the 1960s, but the Executive took
advantage of the absence of a time limit on such investigations andnever announced a decision.
V.THE1960s: PROTECTION MADE MULTILATERAL
The textile industry, by the beginning of the l960s, felt thatit was being squeezed between US
agricultural policy and US foreign policy. The US agriculturalprograms maintained fiber prices in the
US above world levels; to export at least apart of surplus production, the government paid a subsidy on
exports. The export subsidy the US government paid was particularlyonerous since it gave foreign
competitors access to US cotton at a price below what the USindustry had to pay.
At the same time, the Executive branch of the USgovernment viewed trade policy primarily as
foreign policy. The Executive resisted the industry'sattempts to gain legislated restrictions and it
exploited loopholes in administered protection to frustrate theindustry's attempts to use that protection.
The Executive worked not just to avoidusing the authority these administrative mechanisms conferred
to restrict textile imports, it worked to avoid thatauthority being conferred.
For the industry, the main lesson of the 1950swas that the Executive, even when the legal
authority to restrict textile imports was available, would bereluctant to do so. And though industry-to-
industry contacts with the Japanese indicated awillingness on the part of Japan to restrain imports, the
US State Department appeared to theindustry to be openly hostile to negotiating such restrictions. The
industry's strategy thus became more directly apolitical one, a strategy that looked for opportunities to
bring the power of the industry to bear on nationalelections?
As to the mechanics of restricting imports, thestrategy of the industry was still to press for
import quotas? Quotas were the preferred instrumentbecause the industry concluded that they had15
little chance in the existing political climate of winning tariffs sufficiently high to make up the difference
between their costs and those of Japan and Hong Kong.3°
The eventual focus on the VER as the standard policy instrument was less a matter of strategy
than an accommodation to the circumstances the industry itself faced. Negotiation was an important part
of the ethos of trade policy. Unilateral action violated the Wilsonian principle of international rule of law
and the populist idea that cooperation made for good neighbors. It also brought back memories of the
beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 193Os.'
The idea of negotiating a multilateral agreement to legitimize and regulate these restrictions was
likewise an accommodation rather than a strategy. In all then, the path from the first VERs with Japan
on cotton textiles to the MFA was less a grand design than a sequence of steps that were guided, one at
a time, by circumstance.
President Kennedy and the First Multilateral Agreementsn
To win the presidency, John Kennedy focused on New England, the traditional Democratic Party
strongholds, the northern industrial states and the South. A promise of protection for the textile industry
would help in the South and in New England: it would be particularly important in the South, where
Kennedy's Catholicism was a significant liability. And polls indicated a close race with Republican
candidate Richard M. Nixon.
Kennedy's pledge to make a solution to the cotton textile import problem a top priority of his
administration won the support of several Southern leaders, including Luther Hodges, a textile executive
and former Governor of North Carolina, Governor Ernest Hollings of South Carolina and Governor Terry
Sanford of North Carolina. The cotton textile industry evaluated John Kennedy's promise of support as
more concrete than Richard Nixon. and many members of the industry worked actively to support
Kennedy's election."
By the fall of 1961, the Trade Expansion Act had become an important part both of President
John F. Kennedy's foreign policy and economic agenda. As it had been to other post World War
presidents, to President Kennedy and to his allies in the government, commercial diplomacy was first-of-
all a tool of foreign policy. Through a new round of GAiT negotiations the President could build a
relationship with the increasingly successful European Common Market, and thereby renew the strategic
alliance between the United States and Western Europe. He could also take the lead on special measures
to help developing countries, bringing them on board of his aggressive Cold War policy. As economics,
the TEA —Kennedyhoped —wouldboost US export competitiveness, thereby helping to slake the US
payments imbalance and the gold drain. The act also took on some of the burden to stimulate the16
domestic economy: it becamesomethingof a panaceaforpresent problems and future circumstances,
foreign and domestic.
But President Kennedy was also a New Dealer: he felt it was the government's job to cure
economic distress. Before he became President he had supported import restrictions of particular interest
to New England industries, among them textiles and fish processors. The rhetoric Kennedy had used to
explain his position on trade was the usual. lie attacked imports as the result of "cutthroat competition'
from foreigners, he disfavored "unjustifiable protection," but felt that "a tariff to equalize competition
is necessary."
President Kennedy sought no common denominator between what he sawasthe benefits and the
risks of negotiating down US protection. Striking a balance was not a philosophicalprocess,itwas a
politicalone. To explain how President Kennedy went about putting together the votes needed to pass
the act, Zeiler quotes a Kennedy associate: "You want the votes, you give theguy the post-office." In
the Boston school of politics in which John F. Kennedy was trained, this was howphilosophical
differences were reconciled.
The textile industry, particularly the cotton textile industry, had been pressing forward on several
fronts to gain import protection and other forms of governmentsupport. To win their support for the
Trade Expansion Act, President Kennedy in May 1%! offered a seven pointprogram that included:
-actionto eliminate or offset the raw cotton price differential;
-assurancethat careful consideration would be given to a textile industry application for
protection under the escape clause or the national security provisions of trade law; and
• to direct the State Department to convene a conference of textile importing andexporting
countries to develop an international agreement goveritg textile trade?'
Zeiler reports (p. 86) that by March 1962, President Kennedy hadimplemented or had made
commitments that would soon implement all seven points. The highlights ofKennedy's actions (see also
Table 4 for a chronology of events) were the following:
July1961
The Short Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles was signed.
Febnsary 1962
The Long Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles was signed.
April 1962
President Kennedy embargoed eight categories of cotton textiles fromJapan.17
June 1962
Congress passed and President Kennedy signed a bill giving the President authority to limit
imports from non-singers to a multilateral agreement?
The textile industry kept its part of the bargain. As Zeiler (p. 86) reports their reaction:
[Kennedy] earned an acknowledgement from the journal Textile World that [he] had
'gone to bat for the industry.' The National Cotton Council announced its support for
the Trade Expansion Act because of the 'exceptional treatment' given by Kennedy to the
textile import problem. Victory was definitely his, however, when the American Cotton
Manufacturers institute thanked hint on March 31, 1962, for his 'unprecedented degree
of thoughtful consideration and constructive action for textiles.' The ACMJ then
endorsed the Trade Expansion Act.
In June 1962 Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Two thirds of Congressman
Carl Vinson'sTM 'Textile Conference Group' voted for the bill and against critical amendments that would
have substituted a bill that offered considerably restricted negotiating authority to the President. Eighty
two of 105 House Southern democrats voted for the act, and in the Senate, 19 of 20 Southerners?
Provisions of the Lona Term Arran2enlent
The Short Term Arrangement provided for one year restrictions of imports of cotton products and
for further international negotiations to develop a long term solution. Before it expired, the Long Term
Arrangement had been agreed (see Table 4).
The main operative provision of the Long Term Arrangement was Article 3. That article
provided that whenever imports of a particular product caused or threatened market disruption, the
importing country could request the exporting country to restrict its exports. While the Arrangement
specified that the request for restraint be accompanied by a "detailed factual statement of the reasons for
the request," it implicitly left to the importing country the authority to determine when 'disruption' was
present or threatened.
Annex B specified that the minimum level to which exports could be restrained was the level of
actual imports for the 12-month period ending three months before the restraint went into effect. If the
restraint was in effect for more than one year. the restraint level should be increased by at least 5 percent
each year. Market disruption did not have to be demonstrated again for renewal.
Article 3 also provided that if 60 days after an importing country had requested an exporting
country to restrain, no agreement to do so had been reached, the importing country could take unilateral
action, subject to Annex B's statement of minimum levels.18
Article 4 specified that the Arrangement "shall not prevent the application of mutually acceptable
arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the basic objectivesofthis arrangement."
The 1984 GAIT textile study (1984, p. 73) points out that bilaterals negotiated under Article 4
eventually became the form of application of the Arrangement preferred both by the United States and
by exporting countries. Article 3 agreements had to be renewed each 12 months, longer tenn agreements
were administratively convenient for the United States and provided exporters greater long range
security."
Several factors contributed to other countries acquiescing to US pressure for a multilateral
agreement to limit textile exports. Not the least of these, of course, was the power of US pressure at the
time. Japan. for her part, had not yet gained the economic strength that allowed her to hold out for
several years against the expansion of the agreement to wool and man-made fibers. In 1962, Japan still
had a trade deficit with the United States.
Many European countries had retained their post World Waril quotas on Japanese textiles when
Japan acceded to the GAiT. Japan viewed a multiiateraJ agreement as possibly improving her access to
European markets. Also, the Japanese and US cotton textile industries had been in close contact in the
1930s and had reestablished that contact in the 1950s. The Japanese industry had consideredgenerous
the quotas she had negotiated previously with the United States. Many European countries had imposed
similar quotas on developing country exports, in many cases declaring them wider the balance of
payments provision (article XII) of the GAiT. When GAIT regulations on use of balance of payments
provisions by developed countries were tightened in 1958, these European countries were left looking for
GArY cover for restrictions they were reluctant to remove?
As to the exporting countries. US pressure was probably the most important factor. It is possible
that exporting countries viewed a multilateral agreement as an instrument the USgovernment might use
to resist rather than to advance the proposals of the US industzy. A èimilar argument had been applied
in generic terms to the GAIT and the US government had displayed a reluctance touse the authority
to restrict textile imports that US law provided. In addition, there was fear of an individual exporting
country getting left out in the countnj-by-coun.try bargaining that seemed to be the real alternative to a
multilateral agreement. Hong Kong, after agreeing to limit her exports to the United Kingdom, had lost
to India and Pakistan some of her share of the United Kingdom import market.
A final factor is that the exporting countries may have underestimated the authority over textile
imports that the combination of a multilateraJ agreement and domestic law, particularly Section 204 of
the AgriculturaJ Adjustment Act, would provide. Section 204(passed in May 1956) authorized the19
President to negotiate with foreign governments to limit the export to the US of agricultural or textile
products, and to carry out such an agreement by limiting the entry of such products into the United
States. The LTA thus activated the president's "204' authority in place. President Kennedy quickly
imposed limits on several categories of imports from Hong Kong. By the end of 1963. the US had in
place restrictions against 17 countries
Evolutionand Exr,ansion into the Multi Fibre Arrangement
Richard Nixon, running for the presidency in 1968 against Hubert Humphrey, had learned from
the 1960 lesson of the power of the textile industry. He thus pledged in his campaign to negotiate an
international agreement that would include wool and man-made fiber products. Japan by this time was
in a stronger position and their experience with the STA and LTA had taught exporting countries what
they could expect from an international agreement.
The provisions of the MFA reflected a shift of power towards the exporting countries. The
hortatory statement of the agreement's intentions is more detailed and more extensive about the expansion
of exports of developing countries. The agreement also urges importing countries who restrict imports
to pursue policies to promote adjustment. Article 3, as did the parallel article in the STA, provides for
an importing country to seek from an exporting country an agreement to limit its exports, it also provides
that the importing country may take unilateral action if agreement is not reached within 60 days. Annual
limits, whether agreed or unilateral, were to be based on the twelve months ending two months before.
If a limit was extended, the minimum growth rate was 6 percent.
There were two significant differences between the MFA and the LTA:
I. The MFA did not provide for "mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms,' i.e., there was
no end-around the limits the arrangement put on allowable quotas.
2. MFA created a multilateral surveillance institution, the Textiles Surveillance Body, to supervise
the functioning of the Arrangement. Participants were required to report safeguard actions to the
TSB, which reviews their conformity with the provisions of the Arrangement. The TSR is also
the forum for dispute settlement.
The extensions of the MFA through 1986 tended to shift the balance toward tighter import
restrictions. In 1977, at the urging of the EEC, a provision was added to allow 'jointly agreed
reasonable departures" from the limits of the agreement. This provision shifted greater power to the
individual countries negotiating the bilateral agreements under the MFA. away from a multilateral
solution. In negotiating bilateral agreements, industrial countries were much less likely to care about
opening up new markets and much more concerned about protecting their industries fromadditional20
imports.Aggarwal(1985) arguesthatthecombinationof the1977provision andtheimportant role of
bilateral agreements in implementing the provisions of the MFA exacerbated the trend towards more
protection.
In the rest of this paper. we focus on the scope and impact of the protection received under the
MFA, While the protection the US textile industry received was substantial, it was, to some degree,
leaky. Although the US government was forced to establish the legal statements of the multilateral
arrangements and their implementation in domestic law —principallyin Section 204, as amended, of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act —considerableeffort was applied within the government to limit the
application of those legal instruments.
VI. PROTECTION, BUT NOT COMPLETE PROTECTION
While the protection won by the industry was substantial, policy makers remained uneasy with
the extent of trade restrictions in textiles. Officials who were chosen to lead (be negotiations were often
aggressively pro-trade; implementation of the agreements has often been lax. The ultimate test is provided
by the impact of these restrictions on imports, domestic production, and the overall health of the industry.
Textile imports as a percentage of US consumption are now four times higher than they were in 1960,
apparel imports are seven times higher. The industry never completely overcame the Executive branch's
reluctance to provide protection and the trading community's inventiveness at finding ways to evade the
mechanisms of restriction.
Negotiation and Imolementation of the Textile Agreements
One early example of the reluctance to embrace managed trade in textiles is provided by President
Kennedy's candidate for negotiating the multilateral restraint agreement. Kennedy gave the position to
George Ball, then Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs."Mr. Ball was a leading
internationalist in the US government and a leading spokesperson for the foreign policy view of trade
policy. In the first year of the Kennedy administration he had been the State Department official
responsible for the administration of US foreign aid, and he had led the reorganization of this
administration into the Agency for International Development. He also had the lead within the Kennedy
administration on the Trade Expansion Act.
While we have located no public statement by Mr. Ball that reveals his opinion of the textile
negotiations that he led, his feelings on textile restraints are revealed by a later statement regarding textile
negotiations during the Nixon administration:
If our relations with Europe have suffered from neglect and presumptuousness,
interspersed with occasional pettiness ...theNixon Administration was reckless to the21
point of irresponsibility when it weakened the alliance ties that bound Japan to the West.
The primal cause of the deterioration of relations was a tradesman's argument over the
export of Japanese textiles to the United States.°
After President Kennedy assigned Mr. Ball to negotiate a textile agreement, Mr. Ball visited
several national capitals to line up support. According to the American Textile Manufacturers Institute,
Mr. Ball's briefing to them on his findings included the following points:
• the State Department is opposed to United States control of textile product imports;
• intends to seek agreement only on cotton textiles;
• proposes to use the 1960 level of imports as the base; and
• plans for the agreement to provide for increases of 5 percent."
Senator Pastore and Congressman Vinson organized a group of 39 senators and 124
representatives to protest the State Department position directly to President Kennedy," but the draft
arrangement the US delegation took to the negotiations contained these terms, and these terms are the
ones in the agreed arrangement.
To oversee the textile program President Kennedy created the Cabinet Textile Advisory
Committee and a lower level committee now named the Committee for Implementation of the Textile
Agreements (CITA). These committees include representatives of the departments of Commerce, State,
Labor, and Treasury, plus the office of the Trade Representative. The day-to-day process of
implementing the agreements goes something as follows.'
The MFA provides for restraint of imports that cause "market disruption." When the textile
industry feels that market disruption is occurring in a particular product category, they make the facts
known to CITA.
CITA meets usually at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary (senior civil service), with the
Commerce Department representative chairing. The CITA presents its own "disruption statement.' on
which the industry often comments. That comment often includes the provision of more up-to-date data
on the state of the domestic industry: output, prices, employment, etc. Sometimes an industry association
surveys US companies to obtain up-to-date information, then submits these data as a comment on the
CITA's disruption statement.
The basic factual inputs into the disruption report are quantities and unit values of imports that
have an adverse impact on the US industry. These data are buttressed with data on domestic production,
employment, capacity utilization, etc. Sometimes other relevant information is provided. such as a
decision by a US producer to cancel an investment or expansion plan.22
inthe end, industry officials insist, there isa loose relation between the disruption statement and
the quota that is set. Although the decision on whether to impose a quota appears to be significantly
influenced by industry recommendations, industry representatives argue that quota jy are often set at
levelswhich aremuch higher than they requested. Under MEA rules, the US may set an initial quota
on a new product, but the US must thenenterinto negotiations with the exporting country to agree a final
quota level. While the Commerce Department Administrators are usually sympathetic to the industry's
position, the final quota level must be negotiated by the Trade Representative with the exporting country
and must win the approval of the interagency committee. This committee includes two "general interest"
departments, State and Treasury. Often the final level is more than twice the level of the initial quota,
and eventheinitial quota is larger that the limit actually needed to stop market disruption.
From the industry's perspective, there are some who feel that the restraint agreements havenot
been rigorously enforced. The ATM! evaluated that in the 12monthsthe STA was in force, imports
were 1/3 higherthanif the minimums the agreement allowed had been achieved. The same evaluation
concludedthat'while PresidentJohnson successfully pushedthroughlegislation abolishingthetwo-price
system, hisadministrationwas muchweakerin carryingoutthe textile import quota system.*
In 1984, when imports surged as the dollar appreciated, the ATM! testified that through the first
10 months of 1984, of the imports of uncontrolled products that were causing market disruption and
eligible for a "call" under the MFA, only 1/3 had in fact been 'called.' A 'call' is a notification to an
exporting country that its exports of a particular product are causing market disruption, and that a
preliminary quota will be imposed.
Another way to soften enforcement of limits is through the various dimensions of customs
enforcement, e.g.. lax policing of transshipment of Chinese textiles through countries not under restraint
or unable to fill their quotas from their own production. A recent agreement between the United States
and Chine involved allegations that transshipment of Chinese textiles to the United States exceeded $2
billion a year. Since China's textile exports to the United States under the MFA were $4.68 billion in
1993, this suggests that transshipment.s could raise export levels to 150 percent of actual quotas.4'
Impact of Protection on the Health of the Industry
The protection the industry won was substantial. Cline (1990), for example, estimates that
quotas as of 1986 provided the equivalent of a 28 percent tariff on textiles and a 53 percent tariff on
apparel. Other industries on average enjoy tariffs of no more than 5percent"Without this protection,
Cline estimates, there would be about 2! thousand fewer jobs in textiles and 214 thousand fewer in
apparel production in the United States.23
The extent to which protection in the textile industry actually restricted imports is documented
in Figures 1 and 2. As indicated in Figure 1, import penetration in the textile sector appears to have
considerably stowed under protection. In comparison to other industries, import penetration increased
at a much slower rate. In the 1980s, however, import penetration rapidly increased. Figure 2 documents
the changes in import penetration in the apparel sector. Although protection also appears to have
dampened the upward trend in imports in the 1970s, increases in import penetration were much more
dramatic than in textiles. In the 1980s, import penetration in apparel surged, growing at a more rapid
pace than in other industries.
The story presented in Figures 1 and 2 is supported by the evidence in Table 5, which is taken
from Cline (1990). Table 5 presents changes in import volumes (not import penetration). The evidence
does seem to suggest that the MFA slowed down import growth, particularly in the textile industxy.
After the MM was introduced, growth rates in imports of textiles and apparel both felt. In textiles,
growth rates became negative, and only recovered in the earty l980s. Table 5 also documents the
significant increases in imports during the first half of the 1980s. Cline attributes these increases to the
overvaluation of the dollar and recovery from the recession.
The evidence in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that textile imports kept pace with the rest of US
industry, while apparel imports surged ahead. The dramatic increases in apparel imports during the
1980s and early 1990s, as well as the more moderate increases in textile imports, is particularly
iltustrative of the "leaky" protection which has characterized the MFA. According to Cline, textile and
apparet imports rose by 100 percent in real terms between 1983 and 1986. How could such an increase
occur under a regime which was committed to import growth rates of no more than six percent annually?
Evidently, quota allocations were sufficiently flexible and underutilized (see Table 6) to allow the sudden
increase. Nor, according to the Congressional Budget Office, coutd these increases be accounted for by
imports from unrestricted sources (see dine (1990)).
Although import protection saved thousands of jobs in textiles and apparel, it did not prevent
significant downsizing of employment. Figures 3 and 4 document the downsizing of employment in the
textile and apparel industries between 1958 and 1986. Downsizing was more significant in the textile
than in the apparel industry. Between 1958 and 1986, employment in textiles shrank by 30 percent. In
apparel, which faced even steeper import competition, employment declines only totalled 20 percent. By
1986, total employment in the two industries had shrunk to between 70 and 80 percent of their 1958
levels.24
The textile industry was more successful in downsizing its labor force, in part due to
technological advances in the textile industry which encouraged mechanization. However, productivity
performance in both sectors hasnotbeenparticularly impressive. Figure 5 showsthe trends in output
per worker for the textile, apparel and other manufacturing sectors. Although the textile industry
performed relatively better than apparel, both sectors lagged in productivity increases càmpared to the
rest of manufacturing. The divergence between the rest of manufacturing and these two sectors appears
to begin in the early 1970s, when the MFA was put in place.
Using the NBER trade database, we also computed measures of total factor productivity growth
(TFPG) for textiles, apparel, and the rest of manufacturing. The trends in TFPG are reported in Table
6. TFPG was calculated by subtracting growth in labor (number of workers), material inputs, and capital
stock from output growth. Labor and material inputs were weighted by their shares in output.
The trends in TFPG are similar to the trends in labor productivity. Prior to 1973, productivity
growth in textiles was slightly higher than the manufacturing average. Productivity increases in apparel,
on the other hand, were significantly behind, averaging 0.6 percent increase per year in comparison with
1.2 percent for the rest of manufacturing. During the 1973-86 period, the gap widened even further.
While TFPG averaged 1.4 percent for the rest of manufacturing, productivity growth for textiles slipped
to 0.6 percent and for apparel, 0.5 percent. The net evidence seems to suggest that at least in the apparel
industry, protection did not serve as a vehicle for a productivity turnaround. The textile industry, while
it performed slightly better than the industry avenge during the 1960s and early 1970s, lagged behind
after 1973.
The evidence presented above suggests that the protection granted to the industry, while
substantial, was not enough to prevent significant increases in import competition. The MFA led to a
decline in the growth rate of textile and apparel imports during the 1970s, but this decline was followed
by a surge in the early 1980s when the dollar's appreciation was combined with an economic recovery.
The surge in imports during the 1980s provides persuasive evidence that MFA protection was certainly
not complete. Additional evidence is provided by US administration efforts to implement protective
legislation in less restrictive ways.
Increased import penetration was accompanied by downsizing in employment. The labor force
in textiles and apparel declined by 20 to 30 percent between 1958 and 1986. Total factor productivity
growth, although positive, was not sufficient to restore the overall health of the industry. Under the
MFA. productivity growth in apparel and textiles lagged behind the manufacturingaverage.25
VII. QUAN'rIFYINc THE DETERMINANTS OF MFA PROTECTION, 1981-1989
Despite the vast literature on protection in the US textile industry, there few studies that attempt
to quantify the determinants of protection within the industry. Most empirical studies, such as the
comprehensive study by Cline (1987) and the recent volume edited by Hamilton (1990), focus on either
measuring welfare costs of protection or evaluating its impact on industry profits, productivity and trade.
Cline (1987), for example estimates that the cost of textile and apparel protection (in 1986) amounted to
between 20.3 Billion and 40 billion dollars annually. This translates to a cost per household of between
240 and 500 dollars annually, in 1986 dollars.
One area that has been entirely neglected is how US policy makers allocate import quotas across
exporting countries. Dean (1990) evaluates the role of quota allocations in diverting demand towards
smaller exporters, but does not address the endogenous determination of quota allocations. The size of
these quota allocations represents a significant fraction of total export earnings for many developing
countries. Understanding the determination of quotas is consequently of practical importance.
En,virical Framework
The analytical models described in Section II, combined with the administrative criteria for quota
allocations outlined in Section VII, suggest a relationship between the variables listed in Table 7 and
quota determination in the United States. For each variable. Table 7 indicates whetherit serves as an
MFA criterion for market disruption or whether it acts as a proxy for factors which are likely to be
important in determining protection from theoretical models of endogenous protection. The last two
columns in Table 6 indicate whether the expected relationship between quotas and each of the variables
is likely to be positive or negative.
There are two columns of expected signs, one relating to the question, 'On which products
imported from which countries is it more likely that there will be a quota? In this framework, we are
simply trying to identify whether or not a quota will be imposed (ie the answer is either 'Yes' or'No'.
The second column refers to the question, "On which products imported from which countries is the
import quota likely to be larger?' A larger quota, of course is a less restrictive one,hence the signs in
the last column are the reverse of the signs in the first column.
The expected sign is the one predicted by the model I proxied by the variable. In reality, the
distinction between the various models may be somewhat blurred. For example, we list 'Employment"
(number of workers) as a proxy for the 'adding machine' model, which suggests thatthe number of
employees (i.e., voters) will be positively correlated with the likelihood of a sectorwinning protection.
But a large number of people working in a sector may present organizational problems,and hence the26
political organization models would suggest a negative correlation between number of workers and the
likelihood of winning protection. However, we consider the latter a secondary fit between proxy and
model, and have not listed it in the table. As to proxies for organizational problems, we consider the
number of plants a better indicator of organizational problems than the number of workers. Within a
plant, lines of communication to workers are already established, hence the organizational challenge
between plants willbemore severe than between workers in a plant.
Our principal hypothesis is that the process of imposing MFA-sanctioned quotas is not limited
to taking into account only the criteria that the MFA specifies as justifying such quotas. We have placed
at the top of the list of explanatory variables those that are specified by the MFA at the criteria that
justify an import quota. If there were no room for discretion in MM administration, then these and only
these variables would contribute significantly to the explanation of actual quota allocations.
The second group ?variableslisted in Table 7 are indirect proxies for pressure from import
competition. The higher the capital/labor ratio of a sector the stronger should be US comparative
advantage and the lesser the likelihood that the sector will experience a degree of import competition
sufficient to cause it to ask for quota protection. The exchange rate, measuring the dollar cost of the
exporting country's currency should have a similar impact, though over time rather than across sectors.
In the lower part of the table we have listed the various "political' influences brought out by the
models of protection reviewed in Section IL Some of these reflect domestic influences such as the
number of votes at stake or the ease the sector might have to organize and to control free riding. Others
reflect international considerations, such as the value of the market to US exporters.
Soecifleations
To quantify the determinants of textile and garment quotas during the 1980s, we analyze two
different dependant variables. We begin by examining the decision to impose a quota, using data which
covers both protected and unprotected products and countries. We then examine the determination of
quota levels, using a tobit specification. We describe these two approaches in more detail below.
We begin by addressing the following economic problem: what are the determinants of whether
or not a quota will be imposed on a particular country or product? For a particular product i in country
jandtime t, a quota is either imposed (Yq=l) or not (Y=O). Whether or not aquota is imposed is
a function of both countiy and product-specific attributes, denoted by the vector x. This problem could
be rephrased as follows:
(1)Y*B'x*+u*27
We asswnethat ishas a logistic distribution. Y is not observed; what we do observe is the following:
Y = 1 ifY >O(ieanon-zeroquota is imposed)
Y = 0 otherwise (no quotas)
Thisproblem is a standard logit problemwhichcan be easily solved using conventionalmaximum
likelihood estimation. We Include the following variables in the vector x as determinants of the
probability of protection: (I) wageç11 (MFA product category i at time t-1) (2) total number of
employees,.1 (3) total number of plants1 (4) avenge plant size,definedas employeesLL4/plantsLl (5)
change in US production..kI (6) thange in import penetration (7) import penetratiom1.1 (8) The percent
changein USexports to country jinperiod (9) GD? growtl for trading partner jintime t (10) the US
bilateral(nominal) exchangerate with country jintime t (11)changein capital stoclç11(12) profits,1
and (13) the capital/labor ratio in sectoriat time v.1.
All variables except profits, the capital/labor ratio, GD? gro*th, import penetration, and US
production are measured in logs. Wages are defined as average compensation per worker, deflated by
the Consumer Price Index. To avoid endogeneity problems, all variables except the exchange rate. GD?
growth, and the change in US exports are measured at time t-1 for a quota imposed in period t. The
change inimportpenetration is defined as import penetration at time v.1 less import penetration at time
v-2. Changes in US production and capital stock are defined as differences of lagged values as well.
A second approach is to focus not just on whether a sector received quota protection ("Yes' or
"No"), but to analyze what determines the relative magnitudes quotas across different sectors. Since
quotas were imposed for only 20 percent of the 20.000 observations in the samnple the resulting function
is likely to be highly nonlinear. Although OLS estimation would lead to biased estimates, Tobit
estimation can be used to address the censoring problem. The data is censored in the sense that we do
not observe the quota level for a large share of the sample. However, unlike standard censoring
problems, where the dependent variable is generally censored from below (typically at zero), in this case
the censoring occurs from above —absenceof a quota should not be represented by a "0' value, but by
a number large enough so that it has no restrictive effect. For a product on which no quota is imposed,
the quota's magnitude might be approximated by an arbitrarily large quota, greater than or equal to an
upper limit denoted by U. Then, equation (1) can be rewritten as follows:28
(2) Y =B'x1÷ u
ifY"<U (aquotaisimposed)
Y =U ifY >=U(noquotaimposed)
The quota level, measured by the value of the latent variable 'r,isonly observed if a quota is imposed.
If no quota is imposed, we interpret the quota as having an infinite magnitude, and we model the infinite
quota as a quota which is censored at an upper limit U. In the estimation, we specify U to be equal to
the maximum quota level observed during the sample period. We also experimented with alternative
values for U, but these did not affect the results and consequently are not reported. The Tobit model
with censoring from above can be estimated using standard maximum likelihood techniques.
Data
The database, which coven the period from 1981 to 1989°, was created by merging information
from a number of different sources. Data on quota levels and imports at the level of each MFA category
was collected by the International Economics Department at the World Bank, based on the 'Expired
Restraints of the Performance Report" prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce. A more detailed
description of the World Bank MEA data is provided by Ertan, Goto, and Holmes (1990). Information
on quota levels is available annually, at the level of the individual country exporting to the United States
and the individual MFA product category. All quota levels are defined in physical quantities, such as
dozens of dresses or square yards of cotton cloth. Rather than attempt to use conversion factors which
provide crude ways to aggregate across different units of measurement, we used the original quantities.
However, to avoid nonsensical comparisons between different physical units, we included type dummies
for each of the eight different quantity measures included in the database."
MFA quotas and shipments were merged with BLSdataon numbers of establishments, the wage
bill, and total employment. Wages, employment, and establishments are recorded annually, at the four-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). To merge the two sets of data, we created a concordance
between the SIC and the MFA categories. Since there were less than IOU SIC codes for textiles and
apparel (SIC categories 22 and 23) but several hundred MFA categories, this required sometimes using
the same SIC code for several different MFA categories. Real wages were computed by dividing the
wage bill by the number of employees, then deflating by the Consumer Price Index.29
Information on US production and total US imports, in physical units and by MM category, is
collected by the Textile Division in the US Department of Commerce. The import data aggregates over
all imports into the United States. Using this data, import penetration was calculated as the share of
imports in domestic consumption, defined as the sum of imports and domestic production. Although it
wouldhave beenpreferable to subtract out US exports in calculating import penetration, this information
was notavailable byMFAcategory.
Theimport penetration and production data was directly merged byMFAcategory with the
database on quotas and shipments. Source country GDP (in real levels), GDP growth rates, US total
exports to each MM exporter, and exchange rates were all taken from World Bank sources. The
exchange rate, in dollars per unit of foreign currency, was converted to an index using 1981 as a base
year.
Data on US capital stock for the four digit SIC categories which include textiles and apparel was
taken from the NBER trade data file. Details on constniction of the capital variable is provided by
Abowd (1991). Using variables from the NBER trade files, we constructed a profits variable using the
following definition:
(3)profits =(Value-added-Payroll)/(Valueof shipments)
The profits variable could also be regarded as the capital share in the value of output, or the
return to capital normalized by the value of output. One problem with such as measure is that it is likely
to be higher in sectors with greater capital intensity. To the extent that the capital stock or some other
measure of capital intensity is included in the regression, however, this problem is less severe. Other
shortcomings of this profit measure, which has been frequently used in the empirical industrial
organization literature, are discussed in Schmalensee (1986). Since the capital stock variable is only
available in the NBER trade files until 1986, we will present results with and without the capital and
profit variables.
There are at least two potentially important sample selection issues which arise in assembling this
dataset. The first is that the database generally excludes most industrial countries, with the exception of
Japan and Canada. Consequently, the sample of countries is incomplete. For a complete analysis, we
would need to include all exporters to the United States, including industrial country sources such as
Italy. This is an ongoing project for fixture work. In the meantime, however, it is possible that the
results are subject to sample selection bias. For example, if only the poorer countries are included in the30
sample,thenit is likelythatthecoefficientonrealGD?presentsinconsistent estimates ofthe relationship
betweenexporterwealth and US protection.
A second source of selection bias is due to the fact that the sample is restricted by data
availability. In particular, only those observations are included which have non-missing infonnation on
.wages, employment, US production, and total US imports. If the Department of Commerce is more
likely to have non-missing data for products with high import or production volumes, this could also lead
to selection bias.
Emviricai Results
Table 8 provides an overview of the trends in MEA quota coverage during the 1980s. For each
country in the database, we computed average quota utilization for 1981, 1985 and 1989 by dividing
actual shipments (in physical units) by quota allocations. The fourth column reports the avenge growth
rate in quota allocations by country, averaging over all product categories for each country. The last
column reports the magnitude of US exports to each country in 1989.
In the first three columns, a missing value indicates that no quotas were imposed on the exporting
country. It is evident from Table 8 that the coverage of the MFA, in terms of affected countries,
increased significantly in the 1980s. In 1981, only 22 countries had ceilings imposed on their exports
of textiles and garments; by 1989, the number of quota-constrained countries—which totaled 38 in all—had
nearly doubled.
The extent to which these quotas were actually binding is the topic of another paper. However,
it is clear from Table 8 that severn] major textile exporters attained levels very close to the quota ceiling.
On average, China. Taiwan, and Hong Kong filled their quotas by over 80 percent across all MFA
categories. India increased its average utilization rate from 20 percent in 1981 to 73 percent in 1989;
Mexico increased from 26 percent to 63 percent.
Despite the significant increase in quota coverage during the 1980s, however, quota ceilings were
also significantly relaxed. The fourth column in Table 8 shows that on average, import quotas increased
by almost six percent annually. In other words, although coverage increased, imports into the United
States were also allowed to rise at a moderate rate, as mandated by the terms of the MFA. In some cases
the increase in quota allocations exceeded 10 percent per year (such as in China, Malaysia, Dominican
Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, Uruguay. Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago). The
combination of increasing quota coverage and increasing access to US markets is a key characteristic of
the Multi-Fibre Agreement, which has sought to both increase access by developing countries to industrial
countries and yet ensure an orderly process which would minimize "market disruption" in industrial31
country markets. There are some notable exceptions, however. Quotaallocations to two of the largest
exporters—Taiwan and Hong Kong—increased by less than 4 percent; allocations to Japan actually declined
by almost 2 percent annually.
In Table 9, we compare the means for wages, employment and all the other independent variables
for the quota-constrained and unconstrained MFA categories. Although these comparisons fail to control
for other factors, they do provide a general indication of differences in economic conditions across
protected and unprotected sectors.
A series of t-tests were used to test the hypothesis that the means are equal across protected and
unprotected products. A high t-valuc indicates a rejection of the hypothesis that means are equal across
the two groups. Column 3 in Table 9 shows that the means are statistically different for wages, the
capital stock, the number of plants, average plant size, import penetration. GD? growth in the exporting
country, and the capital/labor ratio.
The results suggest that wages are lower in protected categories, confirming the predictions of
both theoretical models and anecdotal reports on protection in the US textile industry. As pointed out
earlier, however, this could simply reflect the ftct that the US has more of a comparative advantagein
high wage sectors. The results also point to a higher number of plants, smaller plant sizes,and greater
import penetration (in levels) in protected sectors. Using either the capitalstock or the capital/labor ratio
as a measure of capital intensity, we find that no-quota sectors are significantly more capitalintensive.
Finally, the results show that quota-constrained countries exhibit higher GD? growth rates.
The "Yes-No" model. The logit results from estimating the probability of imposing a quota as
a function of the x-vector of independent variables are presented in Table10. All specifications include
annual dummies, but the coefficients on the year effects are not reported in the table. Since capitaland
profit variablesareonly available until 1986, the first two columns report the results from excludingthese
two variables, which nearly doubles the sample size. The last four columns reportthe results from using
two different measures for capital: changes in the capital stock and the capital/laborratio. Each of these
three basic specifications are reported with and without the inclusion of avenge plantsize. Since plant
size is defined in terms of two other variables (employees divided by the numberof plants) we exclude
it from some of the specifications to control for potential collinearity problems.
The coefficients on the independent variables are generally robust across thesix different
specifications and the resulting signs and significance levels are consistentwith our hypothesis that the
MFA criteria are a significant detenninant of protection, but not the only determinants.As indicated by
the stated MFA criteria for protection, high levels of import penetration in the previous yearincrease the32
likelihood of a quota. Likewise, lower levels of net investment (change of the capital stock) increase the
likelihood of protection, as do lower levels of profits.
it was a small surprise to find that changes in US production have no explanatory power in the
regression. The capital/labor ratio, which we interpret as an indicator of US comparative advantage, also
is insignificant. We had hypothesized that the higher the capital/labor ratio of a sector the stronger
shouldbe US comparativeadvantage and the lesser the likelihood that the sector will experience a degree
ofimportcompetition sufficient to cause it to ask for quota protection. The exchange rate, measuring
the dollar cost of the exporting country's currency should have a similar impact, though over time rather
than across sectors. The exchange rate is significant, but the capital/labor ratio is not.
The political variables that are significant reflect both the Equity Concern and the Political
Organization modelsofprotection. Sectors with lower wage rates tend more often to be protected,
likewiseforsectors with relatively large plants. Large plant size represents both a barrier to possible
entry and a likelihood that managerial organization is sufficiently large topermitthat some managerial
resources be madeavailablefor political action.These results suggest that textile producers whoare
numerous and relatively large (in terms of total employment) are most effective in lobbying for
protection.
Some of the correlations we found were not expected, for example, a negative correlation between
the size of the workforce and the probability of protection. Perhaps the explanation is that sectors with
fewer workers are better able to organize and overcome the freerider problem. The ATM! may also take
employment into account in making recommendations for protection, interpreting perhaps a low level of
employment as a sign of industry problems. This interpretation might also account for the negative
relationship between employment and protection.
The impact of international commercial politics is reflected in the negative correlation between
the likelihood of a quota and the growth of US exports to the exporting country. In addition, quotas were
more likely to be imposed against countries with higher levels of GDP and against countries whose levels
of imports from the US were large. These variables both reflect foreign export capacity, and in this sense
the signs of the correlations make sense. But they are the best indicators we have of the capacity to
retaliate, so our results, take at face value indicate that a foreign carrot (rapid growth of imports from
the US) does influence US decision makers, but a foreign stick (the threat of retaliation) does not. This
is at variance with anecdotal evidence that suggests that China has been effective in defending its export
interests by threatening to stop its purchases of US agricultural goods.33
Anotherpossible explanation is that to the extent that richer countries are systematically excluded
from the data sample, the coefficient on the level of GD? is upwards. Thus, if the simple also included
industrial country trade partners of the US, i.e., countries not subject to quota constraints under the
MFA• wemight have found that higher levels of GDP are associated with tower protection. If more
powerful countries (as measured by the level of GD!') are less likelytobe the target of US protectionism,
then this suggests an inverted U-shape between exporter GD? and US protectionism. Very poor countries
and very rich countries are less likely to be quota constrained than middle-income developing
countries.
The "Size of the quota" model.Thelogitresultsshowthe impactof variousfactors on the
probability of a quota. The Tobit estimates, presented in Table 11, examine the impact of these same
factors on the size of the quota. The extent to which the estimates in Table 10 and Table 11 are consistent
willdependon whether the process which generates whether or not to impose a quota also determines
the size of the quota. Let us assume that the two decisions are generated inthesame way. Since a larger
quota allocation reflects a less restrictive trade policy, then the sign on the coefficients in Table 10 should
be reversed in Table 11. For example, if higher wages were negatively associated with the probability
of a quota in the logit results, then higher wages should be positively associated with bigger quotas (less
restrictive trade policies) in the Tobit estimates.
The dependent variable in the Tobit estimates in Table 11 is the log of the quota allocation, which
is specified in physical units. Product dummies are included to account for the fact that not all MFA
categories are measured in the same units. The coefficient on wages, employment, number of plants,
plant size, GIN', US exports, and the exchange rate—which are all measured in logs-can be interpreted
as an elasticity. In column 1, a one percent increase in wages leads to a 5.4 percent increase in the level
of the quota, which indicates looser quotas (ie less protection) in products where US workers earn higher
wages.
The results from the Tobit specification ("Size of quota" model) are consistent with the Logit
estimates ("Yes-No" model). The same MFA variables and political variables are significant in the two
specifications, while their signs —ashypothesized —arereversed from one model to the other. The
Tobit results point to a strong relationship between quota size and the indicators of market disniption
sanctioned by the MPA. The coefficient on change in employment, which varies from 4.5 to 8.9:
suggests that if the rate of growth of employment increased from 0 to 1 percentage point annually, import
quotas would expand between 4.5 and 8.9 percent. The coefficient on capital stock, which is 11.2,
implies that if the growth raze of the capital steck were to increase from 0to1 percentage point annually,34
import quotas would expand by 11.2 percent. A one percentage point increasein importpenetration
(which varies between 0 and one) leads to a reduction in import quotas between 1.8and2.1 percent.
Thisisa very large effect: if import penetration increased from 0 to ten percent of domestic consumption,
this would imply a contraction in quota levels of 20 percent.
The impact of several of the political variables is also significant. A one percent increase in
wages leads to a five to 9 percent increase in the level of the quota. This suggests that the 'equity
concern" factor is important -. more protection is granted when US workers earn lower wages.
The size of the workforce, number of plants, and plant size have smaller effects. A one percent
increase in employment leads to between 1.4 and 2.6 percent increase in the size of the quota, suggesting
a negative relationship between size of the workfbrce and the probability of protection. Higher numbers
of plants and larger plants sizes are both associated with more restrictive quotas: a one percent increase
inthenumber of plants decreases the size of the quota by 1.2 to 2.4 percent. A one percent increase in
plant size reduces the size of the quota allocation between 0.2 and 1.2 percent.
Consistent with the earlier results, richer countries and countries with high GDP growth rates are
subject to more restrictive quotas. Countries which increase GDP growth rates by one percentage point
can expect a 24 percent contraction in export quotas. As in Table 10, the results point to a negative
relationship between the growth in US exports and quota protection. The point estimates indicate that
a one percentage point increase in US exports to an MFA exporter leads to an expansion in its quota
allocation (on average) of between 0.1 and 2.4 percent.
Lessons
Based on our analysis of the pattern of quota coverage under the MFA during the 1980s, we can
draw the following lessons:
(1) Thecoverageof the MFA expanded significantly during the 1980s. Despite the increased quota
coverage, however, the protectionreceivedby the industry was porous. Quota utilization rates
were, on average, considerably below 100 percent. Quota allocations, which grew at slightly
below6 percent annually in real terms, grew at an even faster paceforsome of themajor
exporters, such as China. Although there is strong evidence that increased import penetration
led to expanded quota coverage and more restrictive quotas, quota allocations were also adjusted
upwards to account for growing import volumes.
(2)The determinants of protection within the industry are likely to be quite different than the
determinants of protection across different industries. These differences can be traced to the
political process itself. The power to draw votes was an important factor in gathering national35
supportfor the passage of the STA, LTA, and the MFA. This suggests thattheindustry's large
shareof manufacturing employment inthe 1950s and 1960s was a major factor in contributing
to the industry's success in winning protection. Within the industry, however, it appears that
textile and apparel producers who represented a smaller share of the labor force—as proxied by
the total number of employees—were better able to win protection.
(3)In general, textile and apparel producers with the following characteristics were more likely to
win protection: fewer employees, more plants, lower wages, lower profits, falling investment,
higher import penetration, and larger plant sizes.
(4) Amon2 countries a2amst which ouotas are imnosed, richer countries and countries with higher
growth rates were more likely to have quota restraints imposed on their exports. Since our
sample excludes most of the industrial countries, the results suggest that the richest developing
country suppliers (such as Hong Kong and Taiwan) had almost no negotiating power. Countries
not included in our sample —theindustrial countries, except Japan —arenot there because they
are powerful enough to avoid having their exports of textiles md clothing subjected to MFA
quotas. The countries with enough political power to avoid protection were excluded from the
sample—the majority of the industrial countries. This suggests an inverted U curve between US
protectionism and level of exporter GDP: the richest and poorest countries escape protection.
Among the middle income developing countries, the most successful exporters (measured in terms
of levels or growth yates of GDP) were punished with higher quotas.
(5)Countries that bought increasing volumes of US exports were also less likely to face greater
protection.
VIII. EVALUATION
We are now in a position to evaluate several basic questions relating to the protection that the
textile industry has received:
What range of mechanisms was available to the industry, and why did the industry use one or
several of these more effectively than others?
2. Was the economic and political organization of the industry a significant factor?
3. What was the nature of opposition to the industry's pressure for protection and how did it
influence the degree or form of protection that the industry received?
4. What factors influenced the pattern of quotas across textile and apparel products and
MFA suppliers?36
The key to the industry's political power in the 1950s and 1960s, when it gained and
institutionalized a significantly higher degree of protection than any other industry, was that the industry
was the leading industry in the South, and the South enjoyed disproportionate power in the US Congress.
The South drew its power in Congress from the intersection of the seniority of Southern senators and
representatives plus the power that seniority enjoyed in the committee systems ot' the house and senate.
In the 87th Congress, (1961-62) Southern Democrats held the Chairs of 11 of 18 standing committees
in the Senate, of 13 of 21 standing committees of the House. Their influence over agricultural legislation
(which they used to put domestic legal teeth in the 'tnternationai textile agreements) was particularly
strong. In the House, Southern Democrats held the Chair of the Agriculture Committee and provided
in additions the 8 senior members of the committee. They chaired 12 of 14 standing sub-comedies on
agriculture. In the Senate, a Southern Democrat chaired the Agriculture Committee, S of 6 senior
members were Southern Democrats and Southern Democrats held the chairs of the 4 standing sub-
committees on agriculture?3 Table 12 shows that in the 1950's the textile and apparel industries
accounted for a significant share of manufacturing jobs in all the southern states —overhalf of the
manufacturing jobs in several of them.
Mechanisms
The most direct way to achieve protection is to petition for a legislative action that grants
protection —atariff increase or a quota voted explicitly by Congress. The textile industry had
considerable influence in Congress. but Congress was reluctant to take up directly protectionist
legislation. Part of the explanation for this reluctance was the memory of the Srnoot Hawley tariff.
Another part was the considerable sympathy in Congress for the liberal foreign policy view of US trade
policy —aview that dominated and is most associated with Executive branch thinking. The Congress
thus was a willing co-conspirator with the Executive in the evolution of a system of indirect and
administered protection that infrequently provided protection, though it did provide representatives and
senators a degree of political protection from protection-seeking constituents. And finally, protection
voted directly by Congress would have little chance of avoiding a Presidential veto.M
The threat of legislated protection for the industry was frequently used to push Executive action
to use the authority that existing trade remedies process provided. Beginning already in the 1950s, the
threat of congressional action provided leverage over the Japanese industry and government in the
negotiation of voluntary export restraints.37
AdministeredProtection
The textile industry used the administrative mechanisms that
were available, filing both escape
clause and Section22(of the AgricUltUral Adjustment Act) cases. The avenues could beused to provide
the Executive with the authority to restrict imports, butthey did not mandate that the Executive use that
authority. Having (ailed in the 1950s to force the Executive touse the authority that existing
administrative protection mechanisms provided, the industry made minimaleffort to use its influence to
have Congress eliminate the discretion these mecjjanisn,.s allowed theExecutive. That would be a
strategy developed later, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, and principally by other industries.
Eventually the industiy was successM in forcing the creation of an administrativemechanism
specifically for its benefit. The mechanism was internationally sanctionedby the MFA and its
predecessorcottonagreements, but its legal basewasthe authority that domestic law gave the President
to restrict US imports of textiles and clothing. But while thisspecial purpose mechanism did provide
protection for the industry, it did not isolate the determination of how muchprotection from the political
influences that worked against such protection.
Voluntary Exoort Restraints
The VER was an instrument that accommodated the various influences that
came together to shape
protection. Pressure for protection from the textile industry was, ofcourse, one of these influences, but
there were counter pressures as well. In the l930s, after the SmootHawley tariff was enacted and other
countries had retaliated, governments were wary of triggering furtherretaliation. Negotiation with the
exporting country was the usual response to domestic pressure for increasedprotection. The success of
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program and the creation under USleadership of the GAiT intensified
the US Executive's focus on negotiation as theway to establish trade policy. Along with these changes
came an increased reluctance to limit US imports, even through negotiations. Under
pressure however,
the Executive would turn to the VER. It minimized harm to the "reltionshjp' that existed between the
USandthe exporting country."
Organization
The existence of the American Textile Manufacturers Institutecertainly facilitated putting forward
the industry's case for protection. But the existence of suchan organization was not unique to the textile
industry, and the tightness of the organization seems more likely the result of themeans through which
the industry gained protection than an exogenous determinant of thatprotection.
Many US industry organizations trace their beginnings to theway in which the US government
mobilized industry for World War I.Later, the NRA spurred another round of organization, to38
implementPresident Franklin Roosevelt's policies to pull the US economy out of the 1930s depression.
At the same time, the Japanese government had sponsored a reorganization of Japanese industries. Thus
industry organizations similar to those that existed in the US and in Japan existedin many industries.
The American Textile Manufacturers Institute was, in the 1950, the American Cotton
Manufacturers Institute. The particular issociation between cotton manufacture and the strength of the
Southern congressional delegation led to the cotton manufacturers being the first segment of the industry
to win protection. Later, the association of wool manufacturers was merged into the ACM!,and became
the ATM!. The manufacture of products from man-made fiber was developed on the wholebycompanies
that began in cotton textiles manufacture.
A feature of the textile industry that may have contributed to its political success was that the
industry Includes a number of very large companies plus a large number of relatively small ones. The
presence of large companies meant that among them political organization was relatively easy -among
them, the free rider problem was minimal. In addition, the large number of small companies contributes
a large roll of dues-paying members, and the basis for wide public sympathy. The size distribution of
firms in the industry may enable it to take advantage of both the "adding machine" and the 'pressure
group" routes to protection.
Adaptation
Adaptation to circumstances and to opportunities was an important element in the industry's
gaining import protection. The use of VERa as the major instrument, as explained above, was an
adaptation rather than an exogenous strategy of the industry. Likewise, the idea of international
negotiations to sanction textile agreements was not an explicit strategy of the industry, but when the
Kennedy Administration undertook such negotiations as the means of providing protection that would do
the least damage to its foreign policy, the industry quietly and skillfully secured passage of legislation
that would take give the authority to enforce such agreements to the US government —remove
dependence on the exporting country for enforcement.
Another indication of successful adaptation involved how the European Community was treated.
The industry in the l960s wanted quotas on imports from Europe as well as on imports from Asia. But
the politics of reaching International agreement eventually shifted the US industry to treat European
producers as allies rather than as competitors. Also, the strongly pro-Europe foreign policy position of
the US government in the l960s and 1970s made the US Executive Branch a less than enthusiastic
colleague in restraining European exports. The accommodation that evolved was to leave the tariff on39
textilesrelatively high while controlling Asian exports with quotas. The tariffwas sufficientto provide
relictfrom European producers, whose costsweresignificantly than those ofAsian producers.
Onoosition
Domestic opposition to the industry's pressure for protection cameprimarilyfrom within the US
government —theExecutive's unwillingness to take action against imports. The Executive could count
on support from US heavy industry and from large US banks when it sought authority to negotiate at the
GATFto reduce USprotection. but US business provided no direct opposition to textile industry petitions
forprotection.Theautoindustry,forexample,would support President Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act,
butit wouldnot testi& atan escape clause orSection 22investigation that restrictions on textileexports
wouldincrease itscosts and therebyendangerjobsinthe auto industry.
Bauer, Poole and Dexter (p.218) note that a reluctancetodirectlyopposeanother business'
petition for government assistance was a part of US business ethics in the 1950s and 1960s.
Schattschneider (p.144) likewise notedthat in testimony before the congressional committees that wrote
the SmootHawley tariff, companies whosecosts would by increasedby atariff increaserequested by
anothercompany wouldoppose thatcompany's request. They wouldaskfor acompensatingincrease
in theirown request.
Thesuccessofthetextile industryin securing legislation toimplementwithcontrols attheUS
border international agreements such as the LTA and the MFA can be ascribed to the lack of direct
opposition to textile industry protection. This lack of opposition was due in part to the skill and the
power of the Southern congressional delegation. Because this delegation controlled important agricultural
committees, it could use agricultural legislation as a vehicle to pass imolementina lerislation for the
agreements the Executive was negotiating. For example, in 1962, as the STA was being negotiated, the
industry gained passage of an amendment to Section 204 of the AAA. Section 204, before the
amendment, gave the President power to negotiate limits on exports to the US of agricultural products
and of textiles and to enforce with US import restrictions such agreements. The amendment gave the
President power to limit imports from countries not Dartv to the agreement.TM Congressman Thomas
Curtis, a strong supporter of the liberal trade program usually identified with the Executive, complained
that the amendment had been passed after less that one hour's debate, and had been seen before that only
by the industry and by the administration that was committed to providing protection for the industry.
Curtis also pointed out that this back-room action took place at the very time the Congress was holding
public hearings on the Trade Expansion Act?40
Consumer groups in opposition to the textile industry's protection were not active until the 1980s,
when the renewals of the MFA became political events. Before, consumer groups were weaker and
focused primarily on regulation of health, safety and product standards. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO,
which was opposed to trade liberalization, was ari important funding source?8
While foreign governments were minimally active in opposing creation of the STA and the LTA,
by the 1970s, when the first MFA was negotiated, they became perhaps the major source of direct
opposition to US textile protection.
MFAOuotaAllocations
Although the coverage of the MFA expanded significantly duringthe1980s, the protection was
'leaky'. Quota utilization rates were, on average, considerably below 100 percent. Quota allocations,
which grew at slightly below 6 percent annually in real terms, grew at an even faster pace for some of
the major exporters, such as China. Although there is strong evidence that increased import penetration
led to expanded quota coverage and more restrictive quotas, quota allocations were also adjusted upwards
to account for growing import volumes.
Domestic politics had a lot to do with how quotas were set. In general, textile and apparel
producers with the following characteristics were more likely to win protection: fewer employees, more
plants, lower wages, lower profits, falling investment, higher import penetration, and larger plant sizes.
The MFA and the predecessor international cotton agreements, by establishing 'market
disruption' as a legitimate reason for restricting imports, had the effect of sanctioning such domestic
considerations, but of course, only for the textile and apparel industries.
We also found that while the MEA effectively legitimized market disruption as a reason for
protection, it did not succeed in isolating market disruption as the y determinant. Other influences
have a role in quota determination, and some of these influences —particularlyinternational political
influences —tendtoward looser restrictions. Countries who increased their demand for total US exports
are rewarded with larger quotas. Furthermore, the industrial countries (except Japan) avoided US the
MFA, but poorer developing countries are less likely to have quota restraints imposed on their exports
than richer ones. This suggests an inverted U curve between US protectionism and level of exporter
GDP: the richest and poorest countries escape protection. Among the middle-income developing
countries, the most successibl exporters (measured in terms of levels or growth rates of GDP)were
punished with higher quotas.41
Sumnhin2 liD
Alltold, the major factors underlying the success of the textile industry inwinning protection
Were:
1. the political power of the industry, based on its close association withthe Southern congressional
delegat ion;
2. the relativelyweakinfluenceoverUS policy of the Asian countries against whichexport
restraints weredirected;
3. thesuccessofthe industry in adjustingitsdemandsonthe form of protection that it wanted to
the possibilitiesallowedby the international politics of the day.42
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ENDNOTES J. MichaelFinger
Ann Harrison
1. We use theword "political0to describe a decision in which the deciding agent has the
authority to determine the criteria by which the decision will be made. The US Constitution gives
Congress the authority to regulate foreign commerce but does not specify criteria that Congress must
take into account in deciding if or to what degree foreign commerce will be regulated. Congress'
decisions are therefore by out definition "political0 decisions. In contrast, there are also 'technical"
decisions. A technical decision is one in which the criteria are exogenously specified: the deciding
agent is charged only to decide if these criteria are met. Antidumping cases exemplify "technical"
decisions. In such cases, detailed law and administrative regulations specify the relevant criteria and
the Executive has no discretion to put these criteria aside —itsauthority to take action (impose an
antidurnping order) is directly tied to its determination as to whether or not the specified criteria are
met.
2. These models are grouped as they are because they point to characteristics of the sector itself
as determinants of the degree of protection a sector will receive.
3. The recent debate over extending China's textile quotas for export to the US market provides
an excellent illustration of the bargaining model. The United States government stated that it was
only willing to grant China more generous quota levels in textiles and apparel in exchange for
increased access to the Chinese market.
4. That the power to make individual decisions on protection rests with the state does not suggest
that state enjoyed autocratic power. Administered protection mechanisms are created through a
democratic process. They have been described by I.M. Destler as providing protection for Congress
from constituents, but there is no suggestion in this that constituents were somehow duped.
Administered protection could likewise be described as providing protection for constituents from46
constituents —from theprisoners' dilemma of any individual sector being better off with protection,
butallbeing collectively worse off if all receive protection.
5. When the Schechter Case decisionwasreturned, the Tariff Commissionhadunder way
Section 3(e) investigations on horse and mule shoes and on bleached cotton cloth. The President had
directed an investigation on cotton and linen netting, but the Tariff Commission had not begun to
work on it.
6. US International Trade Commission. Annual Reoort. 1934, p. 42.
7. Ibid, p. 45.
8. US International Trade Commission, Annual ReDort. 1934, p.48.
9. One outcome of the investigation of red cedar shingles imported from Canada was that the
Canadian industty adopted a code of fair practice similar to the one in place in the US lumber
industry. Restraint of exports to the US became a part of that Canadian code.
ID.Ibid. p. 4.
11.Most of these were submitted by US importers, but some were from foreign exporters.
12.The Tariff Commission had almost limitless discretion to determine if a request from an
interested party justified initiation of an investigation.
13.One investigation was by the Tariff Commission's own motion, all others were by request of
interested parties.
14.Bauge, p. 63.
15.A detail of this agreement was that cotton velveteen or velvet ribbons would be excluded from
the categories under restraint. This exclusion was not pressed for by the Japanese. but rather by a
Tariff Commission determination that no comparably existed between the US made and the imported
variants of the products, and hence that Section 336 provided no authority for a tariff increase.
16.Bauge. p. 95.47
17. The difference at the time between presidential and
congressional trade politics is illustrateri
by the birth and death of the proposal to createthe InternationalTrade Organization. The proposal to
create such an organization and the first draft of a chartercaine from the United States government,
the Executive branch. The ITO failed to be establishedin large part because the UScongress refused
to approve it.
18. Hull, Memoirs, p. 173.
l9.Ibid,p. 364.
20.Brandis,p. 9.
21.Accordingto Cordell Hull, President Franklin Roosevelt saw theAgriculturalAdjustmentAct
andthe National Industrial Recovery Act as thecenterpieces of his economic policy, and derivatively,
sections 22 and 3(e) as the centerpieces of his tradepolicy — at least of the economics of his trade
policy. Thus Hull writes:
The President, still pursuing the theory ofretaining full discretionary authority
to fix tariff rates at any height deemed necessary for the successfuloperation of the
AAA and NIRA, was slow to embracemy liberal trade proposal
Gradually, however, the forces favoring high tariffs, together witha number
of the President's economic advisors connected with theNIRA and AAA. increasingly
urged him to abandon the idea of tariff reductions in order thatour Government
might, if necessary, impose restrictions on imports to enable NIRA andAAA to
function successfully.
Hull's description of how he won President FranJdin Roosevelt'ssupport for the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act suggests that President Rooseveltsaw its value entirely in its foreign policy
dimensions: that he saw its economic dimensions ascosts, not as benefits.
22. Brandis,p. 26.48
23.No restriction was the Administration's preferred outcome, negotiated restrictions its failback
position. The following statement by Secretary of State John Foster Duties is characteristic of the
liberal, foreign policyview of trade policythat dominated Administration thinking: "The United
States does not have a single mport quota on manufactured products, and to restrict trade at a time
when the free world must depend on the expansion of trade for so much of its strength would
severely weaken the United States and the free world." (Quoted by Bauge, (p. 128) from U.S.
Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 31, no. 861, December 26. 1955, p. 105.]
Dulles added that he would prefer to see domestic industry protected by voluntary action of
the exporting nations.
24.The following discussion draws considerably from Aggarwal.
25.The administrative regulations to implement Section 22 provided for a preliminary
investigation by the Secretary of Agriculture, who then make his recommendations to the President.
The President, in turn, would direct either that no further action be taken, or that the Tariff
Commission make a full investigation. The regulations also provided that the Secretary of
Agriculture would prescribe the manner in which requests for action under the section should be
submitted by interested parties. Because the directive to the Tariff Commission would come from the
President, and because the Secretary of Agriculture served at the pleasure of the President, the
regulations gave to the President the authority to define the terms of the investigation.
26.Brandis, p. 14.
27.Brandis, p. 15.
28.Conversations with textile industry association spokespersons.
29.The South Carolina legislature in 1955 passed a law requiring each business that sold Japanese
textiles to post a sign in its front window announcing that it sold Japanese goods. While quotas were
the industry's preferred instrument, they were not the only instrument it would use.49
30. Conversation with textile industry association officials.
31. In addition, the VER is consistent with the "property rights" implicit in the GAiT. The basic
element in the GAiTisan exchangeof concessions, anexchange between countries of the right to
access to each other's market. If a country wants to take back some of the access it has thus "sold," -
- impose a new import restriction — it owes compensation to the trading parties that "own" that
concession. Ifcompensationis not made, trading parties have the right to retaliate, i.e., take back an
equal amount of the market access that they had "paid" to the offending country. GAIT provides
separate processes to decide offense, compensation and retaliation. A VER considers all of the rights
in one negotiation and thus provides for efficient trade-offs. This view is elaborated in Finger, 1984.
32. This section draws extensively from Zeiler.
33. Textile industry associations officials told us that the two Eisenhower elections had not been
close enough for them to extract significant commitments from either side.
34. The three, according to Brandis (p. 19) were the points of major interest to the industry.
35. The two-price cotton problem was not resolved until April 1964 when President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed a bill that established a payment-in-kind program that made cotton available to
manufacturers inside the United States at the world price.
36. Democrat, Georgia.
37. Textile restrictions were not the only deal President Kennedy made for the Trade Expansion
Act. Senator Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma led the congressionai delegation that represented the oit
producers. The price to lift Kerr's opposition to the TEA was the Arkansas River Bill -- federal
money to make the Arkansas River navigable into Oklahoma. "You know, Bob, I never really
understood the Arkansas River bill before today," President Kennedy remarked as he accepted the
deal. (Zeiler. p. 114.)50
President Kennedy was criticized by members of his own party for the mercenary way in
whith he puttogetherthe votes needed to pass the TEA.
38.Aggarwal, p. 91.
39.Aggarwal, p. 73.
40.Keesing and Wolf, p. 38.
41.A textile executive who was then active in industry politics told us that Mr. Ball was
"embarrassed" by this assigiuttent.
42.Ball, p. 175.
43.Quoted by Brandis, p. 20, from the ATMI report to its membership.
44.Brandis, p. 21.
-
45.The following four paragraphs are based on interviews with industry association officials.
46.Brandis, pp. 27ff.
47.Financial Times, January 18, 1994.
48.See Cline (1990), page 191.
49.in these figures, 'other excludes both textiles and apparel.
50.This time period was chosen because a previous World Bank project had prepared a data base
on US quotas that covered those years. The cost of acquiring and clean up additional information
preventedour extendingthese data back or forward.
51.Physical quantities are reported in the followingdifferentunits: dozens, square meters, square
yards, kilograms, dozen pairs, pieces, pounds, and square feet.
52.Omitted product and country-specific effects that are unobserved and remain constant over
time are a possible source of bias in the estimates presented in Table 10. In a linear regression
framework, these unobserved effects could be accounted for by introducing product and country
dummies,or bytaking deviations from product—country means. In a logit framework, the problem is51
considerably more complicated. However, Chamberlain (1980).proposedan approach which allows
these so-called fixed effects to be taken into account using conventional estimation methods.In the
two-period case, consistent estimates can be obtained by only keeping those cases wherequota
coverage switched from 0 to I (or vice versa) over time. The resulting pairs of (0,1) and (1,0)
observations are then estimated as a function of the x variables differenced over thetwo periods.
We applied this approach to the 1983-1989 and 1983-1986 periods to examine therobustness
of our original specification. Since the resulting point estimates were eithercomparable to the results
in Table 10 or statistically insignificant, they are not reported here. Alarge share of the estimates,
althoughconsistentwith Table 10, were statistically insignificant. One possible reason for this is that
the cross-section variation in the sample is much greater than the time-seriesvariation, which is used
to identify the fixed effect model.
53. Tabulated from Congressional Quarterly, ConRressional Quarterly Almanac, Volumes XVII
and XVIII. The declining power of the industry, shown by its not being able to blockagreement at
the Uruguay Round, reflects both the declining power of the southern delegation in the UScongress
and the increased importance of Asian countries that are major textileexporters in US foreign
economic policy. Their growing importance as dynamic markets for USexports is an important
underlying factor.
54.A Presidential veto might have been avoided by attaching an amendment providingprotection
for the textile industry to a bill the President would not want to lose. But the industrywas not able to
achieve this, e.g., in 1955 losing by two votes in an attempt to add to the foreign aid billan
amendment that would have imposed quotas on textile imports.
55.The quotation above from George Ball is an example of the routine use of the phrase. "the
relationship1 in State Department conceptions of international policy. One of the authors of this
paper, Finger, remembers interagency discussions in the I 970s over the various proposals for a New52
International Economic Order, e.g., commodity agreements, tariff preferences for developing
countries,in which State Department arguments stressed that US support for such proposals was
important toin "the relationship" between the US and developing countries. In a discussion
of the proposed international tin agreement. Finger suggested that the tin agreement would mean the
US would pay more for tin and asked for a list of the economic benefits the US might be able to
extract from tin exporting countries through the relationship that US support for the tin agreement
would establish. The question was never answered, Indeed, it was treated as if it were too vulgar to
warrant answering.
56. Curtis and Vastine, p. 167.
57.Ibid.
58. Conversationswith textile industry association officials.Figure 1
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TableI: Tariff commission Investigadons under SectIon 3(t) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and Outcomes
Arflcle Policy outcome
Wood-casedlead pencils Affin,iative. VER with Japan.
Quicksilver The TC found no section 3(e) grounds for relict.
Wool kit hat bodies The TC found no section 3(e) grounds for relict.
Matches Atfinnalive. Congress imposed an additional excise tax on the type of matches
imported.
Cotton chenille rugs Affinnative. An import fee (in addition to existing customs duties) was
imposed. Also, VER with Japan.
Hit-and-miss-rag rugs Affirmative. VER with Japan.
Imitation oriental rugs Aftinnative. An import fee (in addition to existing customs duties) was
imposed.
Other rugs Affirmative. An irnpon fee (in addition to existing customs duties) was
imposed. Also, VER with Japan.
Red cedar shingles Affinnative. VER with Canada.
Braided hat bodies in pan of The TC found no section 3(e) grounds for relief.
synthetic textile
Source: US Tariff Commission. Annual Reooru, 1933, 1934. and 1935.2
table 2: ApplicatIons for Section 336 InvestIgations, 1931-1941
Nwnbera/ Percenwge of To
Applications received 357
Action requested
Tariff increase 145 41
Tariff reduction 121 34
investigation 82 23
Adjustment_b! 7 2
Shift to American Selling Price 2 <-
Source: Tabulated from ITS Tariff Commission, Annual Revorts, 1931-1941.
Notes:
_a/ Numbers given are the numbers of tariff lines covered by applications. The total number of applications received,
strictly speaking was 297. The Tariff Commission Annual Reoorts however provide infonnation on the nature of requests
and outcomes only by tariff tine.
_b/ These requests were for shifts from specific to ad valorein rates, the reverse shift. or for changes in a compound rate
thai would move the ad valorem component in one direction and the specific component in the other.
_c/ Less than 0.5 percent.Table 3: Outcomes of SectIon 336 ases, 1931.41




Increase] Decrease No Change b/ Total
% qr l'oto.i
Textiles 3 2 2 7 7
Apparel 3 1 I 5 5
Cbeniicals, oils,paints 0 2 4 6 6
Earths, earthenware.
glassware 1 2 5 8 8
Metals, metal
manufacusres 7 2 7 16 16
Wood. wood
manufactures I 2 2 5 5
Sugar. molasses. mips
thereof 0 2 0 2 2
Agricultural products 9 5 16 30 30
Miscellaneous
manufactures 5 7 tO 22 22
Totals 29 25 47 lOt 100
Source: US Tariff Commission. Annual Reports, 1931-1941.
Notes:
a)Includes shifts to ASP valuation on one agricultural product and on one item included 'ut miscellaneous manufactures.
_bI In some of the investigations we have placed in this category the Tariff Commission detennined that the present tariff
equalized foreign and domestic costs and the President issued a formal proclamation of no change. In others, the Tariff
Commission determined that the domestic product and the imported product in question were not comparable. and hence that
Section 336 did not apply. In these instances there was no Presidential proclamation. The tabulation reported here includes
one change (on a chemical product) in which the ad valorem component was increased and the specific component reduced.4
Table 4: Chronology of InternatIonal Events
1961July The ShortTetm Amngemen't isagreed.
1962February The Long Term Arrangement is agreed, to commence October 1, 1962. to last for five
years.
1963 to 1964 The United Stales triesand fails to secure aninternatios agreement on woolproducts.
1965 June The United Statestries and fails to negotiate restraints on Japanese exports of wool
product.
1966 June The United Kingdom implements a global quota scheme in violation of the LTA — the
LTA providing only for product-specific restraints.
1967 April Agreement is reached toextendthe LTA for three years.
1970 October Agreement is reached toextendthe LTAforthree years. It was later extended three
monthsmore, to fill the gapuntiltheMFAcame into effect.
1969to 1971 United Stales negotiates VERa with Asian suppliers on wool and man-made fibers.
1973 December The Multi Fibre Arrangement is agreed, tocommenceJanuary I. 1974 and to last for
four years.
1977 July to December The EEC and the US negotiate bilateral agreements with developing countries prior to
agreeing to extension of the MFA.
1977 December The MFAis extended for four years.
1981December The MFA is extended for four years and seven months.
1986July The MMis renewed for five years. TheReaganAdministration, under pressure from
increased imports resulting from dollar appreciation, negotiates toughquotas.
1991 July TheMFAis extendedpending outcome of the tlnzguayRound negotiations.
1993December The UruguayRound draft final act provides fora len-yearphase outof allMMand
otherquotas on textiles.5







1961-fl 16.1'. 5.9 4.2
1972-77 -9.2 -4.9 -9.3
1977-81 -2.1 43 0.4
1981-86 -21.9 12.7 12.6
Apparel
1961.72 IS.)' 13.8 14.8
1972-li 2.9 ILl 6.7




Source: Clint1990. p. 170.
a. Calculated born log-linear regressions M each period.
b.Square-yard equivalents.
c. 1964-72.
Table 6: Total Factor Productivity Growth In Textiles,Apparel,and the Restof theManufacturing Sector.
Sector 1959-1972 1973 -1986
Textiles 1-3 0.6
Apparel 0.6 0.5
Other Manufacturing 1.2 1.46







Change in U.S. Production Market disruption. MFA criterion - +
Change in Employment Market disruption, MFA criterion - .j.
Change in Import Penetration Market disruption. MFA criterion + -
Import Penetation Market disruption, MFA criterion + -
Change in Capital StOCk Market disruption, MFA criterion - ÷
Profits Market disruption, MFA criterion - +
Capital/Labor Ratio US comparative advantage, lesser pressure
from imports
- +
Exchange Rate Expensive foreign currency lessens pressure
from imports
- +
Wages Equity concern, the poor are deserving - +
Employment Political payoff, number of votes, or + -
Number of Plants Political organization, free-riding from large
numbers
- +
Plant Size (employees per plant) Political organization, resouttes available
for
+ -
Political organization, bathers to entry
limit-free riding
+ .
Change in U.S. Exports Value of market to US exporters - 4-
GDP Growth in Quota Country Equity concern, the poor are deserving + -7
Table8: MFA QuotasIn the 1980. for TheUnitedStates:An Overview
Count?7 QuotaUtilizahon by Year (%) &owt in Quota Total U.S.
1981 1985 1989 ADOCOZIOA 1981-89Erpons. 1989
(Millions)
Costa Rica 100 78 66 41 880
China 91 75 82 10.2 5,807
Taiwan 87 83 70 3.4 11.323
Hong Kong 83 82 79 2.2 6.304
Sri Lanka 85 52 — 10.0 143
Malaysia 83 77 53 16.0 2.875
Korea 82 86 74 1.0 13.478
DominicanRepublic 81 71 -. 13.2 1,646
Pakistan 35 54 43 1.6 1,136
lapin 49 81 27 -1.6 44,584
Haiti 39 39 36 7.0 474
Philippines 29 37 70 3.0 2.206
Mexico 26 30 53 2.6 24,969
Brazil 22 56 43 4.8 4,799
India 20 73 73 4.6 2,463
Macao 20 24 29 -0.6 Ii
Singapore 20 21 29 2.0 7.353
Thailand 16 75 78 11.6 2,292
Romania 13 13 8 -3.4 136
Colombia II 15 26 -10.2 1,916
Poland 9 7 9 -2.2 414
Yugoslavia 0 66 46 12.4 501
Turkey — 91 — 83.4 2.004
Egypt — 77 31 1.8 2.610
Guam — 75 60 2.6 2
Indonesia 74 87 11.4 1,256
Hungary 63 55 8.4 122
Uruguay — 45 — 15.6 133













Pacific Islands 34 48 —
Guawn.ala 14 95 5.8 662
Maldives LI — 0.4 3
Panama 5 I -9.2 729
Bangladesh 84 17.4 282
United Arab-Emirates — 79 35.8 1,240
El Salvador — 66 -39.6 521
East Germany — 60 0.0 94
Jamaica — 37 18.8 L009
Bunna 35 LB 5
NorthernMarianas — 32 5.8 —
Nepal — 28 3.8 9
Canada — 21 78.266
Trinidad & Tobago — — I 12.4 562
Average Across all 47 52 49 —
Coo athes9
Table9: T-TestsofDifferencesAcross Protected and Unprotected MFA Categories, 19S1-89
Va,iabk No Quotas Quotas T-Vabje frr T-Tes? q'
Means






































































Standard Errors in . A (') indicates a rejection of equal means across protected and unprotected categories at the 1% level.
All variables except profits, the capital/labor ratio. GDP growth, import penetration (levels and differences), and U.S. production
are measured in logs. All variables except the exchange rate, GDP growth, and the change in U.S. exports are measured at
time t-l for a quo imposed in period t.10
Table 10: Leglt Model oftheDecision to Impose aQuota
















































































































































































N 20.609 20.609 12,96! 12.961 12.961 12.961
Standard Errors in ).Allequations include annual time dummies. Constant terms not reported. All variables except profits.
the capital/labor ratio, GDP growth. import penetration (levels and differences), and U.S production are measured in logs. All
variables except the exchange race. GDP growth, and the change in U.S. exports are measured at time t-l for a quota imposed
in period t. A 'indicatesstatistical significanceat the 5% level.11
Table11:The DLstrlbution of Quota Allocations Across Textile and Garment Exporters to the United StaIn: Toblt
Specification
Dependent Variable: Leg (Quota)









































































































































































N 20.633 20.633 12.985 12.985 12.985 12.985
Standard Errors in fl. All equations include annual time dummies and unit dummies (for type of quota). Constant tenns not
reported. All variables except profits, the capital/labor ratio. GDP growth, import penetration (levels and differences), and U.S
productionare measured in logs. All variables excepttheexchange sate. GD? growth, and the change In U.S. exports are
measured at time t-l for a quota imposed in period I. A ' indicates statistical significance at the 5%level.12
Table 12: Employmentliitextiles and apparels hidusbies
isapercentage of total manufactaring employment, by state, 1963
Textiles and opparel
State Textile indusby Apparel indusizy indsairies
Qba 14 13 27
Georgia 27 15 42
North Carolina 42 9 51
South Carolina . 50 14 64
Tennessee 18 16 34
Mississippi 4 24 28
Virginia 12 10 22
florida I IS 16
Rhode Island 21 3 24
Connecticut 3 4 7
Massachusetts 6 9 IS
Newlersey 3 9 13
New York 3 16 20
Pennsylvania 5 12 t7

















1960 895 15,194 5.5 3.4 0.65 0.18 17.3
1965 893 19.911 6.0 2.6 0.67 0.19 11.5
1970 924 23,861 5.9 2.4 0.71 0.19 17.5
1975 835 25,304 6.0 4.9 0.66 0.18 17.4
1980 817 29.477 7.0 6.9 0.66 0.21 15.4
1985 658 29,076 12.1 3.6 0.64 0.20
Apparel
1960 1288 19.801 1.9 1.3 0.56 0.17 36.5
1965 1420 23,787 2.7 1.0 0.56 0.20 36.5
1970 1441 26,102 5.1 1.0 0.57 0.23 36.4
1975 1214 26,288 8.3 1.9 0.54 0.23 35.6
1980 1307 29,527 12.9 3.5 0.50 0.26 31.5
1985 1064 31.133 26.4 1.8 0.50 0.27 —
Relative wages arc defined as average wages in the sector divided by avenge wages in the rest of manulacturing.
Profits defined as (value-added-remuneration to Iabor)/valuc of shipments.